市場権限なき市場創設：欧州排出量取引からの事前証拠

日本語

EUのETS2による建築物・道路交通への炭素価格拡張を、希少性・交換・配分権限の三機能で分析。交換と配分権限の完成は2028〜2048年の政策コストを25.5%（1.33兆ユーロ）削減し、配分権限が削減分の76%を占める。残余損失の補償は60億ユーロ（ETS2収入の0.2%）で足りる。配分権限の回復は価格を上げつつ政策コストを下げ、ETSの内生的炭素価格は厚生の十分統計量ではないと示す。

English

Analyzes the EU's ETS2 extension of carbon pricing to buildings and road transport through three market functions: scarcity, exchange, and allocation authority. Completing exchange and allocation authority cuts present-value EU policy costs over 2028-2048 by 25.5% (EUR 1.33 trillion); allocation authority drives 76% of savings and 88% of member states benefit. Compensating residual losses costs only EUR 6 billion (0.2% of ETS2 revenues). Restoring allocation authority raises allowance prices yet lowers policy cost, showing the endogenous carbon price is not a sufficient welfare statistic across institutional designs.

日本のGX文脈において

EU-ETS2の制度設計評価は、日本での炭素価格制度（GX経済移行債・炭素賦課金）や排出量取引制度の拡張議論に直接示唆を与える。市場の「配分権限」設計が政策コストを大きく左右する点は、日本が制度設計を詰める上で重要な論点。

In the global GX context

Directly informs global carbon-market design debates under TCFD/ISSB-era disclosure and transition finance, showing that institutional allocation authority—not just price signals—determines policy cost. Relevant to any jurisdiction extending ETS coverage to hard-to-abate sectors.