競争的デュオポリーおよびデュアルチャネルサプライチェーンにおける価格設定と炭素排出の戦略的整合
Strategic alignment of pricing and carbon emissions in competitive duopoly and dual-channel supply chain (原題)
Yenming J. Chen, Yu-Chung Tsao, Chu-Yu Cheng, Tsung-Hui Chen
🤖 gxceed AI 要約
日本語
デュアルチャネル型サプライチェーンにおいて、デュオポリー企業が炭素排出削減投資水準と価格戦略をどう決定すべきかをStackelbergゲームで分析。集中型・分散型システム間の利益変化を比較し、デュアルチャネルと集中型戦略の採用が企業利益とシステム全体の性能を大幅に向上させることを数値的に示した。
English
This study models a two-echelon dual-channel supply chain with duopoly manufacturers deciding carbon-reduction investment and pricing under centralized vs. decentralized structures via a Stackelberg game. Numerical results show that adopting dual-channel and centralized strategies significantly boosts both firm profits and overall system performance.
Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.
📝 gxceed 編集解説 — Why this matters
日本のGX文脈において
Scope 3排出削減とサプライチェーン全体の最適化が求められる中、日本企業がデュアルチャネル戦略と炭素削減投資を両立させる際の価格・協調設計の理論的示唆を提供する。SSBJのScope 3開示や取引先への排出削減要請への対応を検討する実務担当者に有用。
In the global GX context
As Scope 3 disclosure and supply-chain decarbonization become central to ISSB/CSRD frameworks, this paper offers a game-theoretic lens on how firms can align pricing and carbon-reduction investment across channels, informing supplier engagement and channel coordination strategies under emerging disclosure regimes.
👥 読者別の含意
🔬研究者:デュアルチャネルと炭素削減投資の相互作用をゲーム理論で分析する枠組みを提供する。
🏢実務担当者:サプライチェーン全体の炭素削減投資と価格設定の協調設計に活用できる。
🏛政策担当者:サプライチェーン排出削減を促す政策設計において、企業のチャネル協調行動を考慮する必要性を示唆。
📄 Abstract（原文）
ABSTRACT Under the interaction impacts among dual-channel systems, carbon emissions and pricing scheme, this study developed a two-echelon supply chain system to explore how should duopoly manufacturers determine the optimal investment level for reducing carbon emissions, relevant pricing strategies, and analyze how supply chain enterprises can increase their own and the overall channel system’s profits. From a two-dimensional framework, i.e., both the echelon-orientated and the dual-channel-orientated channel coordination problems, we investigate channel cooperative issues between channel upstream and downstream entities, and the introduction of dual-channel for the channel competition. In a Stackelberg game setting, we also explored the profit changes for manufacturers and the retailer in the centralized and the decentralized supply chain systems. Realistic considerations and the numerical findings of this study provide structural and quantitative insights for the supply chain entities to make sustainable decisions. The purpose of this study is to investigate how duopoly manufacturers should coordinate pricing and carbon emission reduction strategies across dual channels under centralized and decentralized systems. Through a Stackelberg game framework, we derive optimal decisions and compare four policy-channel combinations. Numerical results reveal that adopting dual-channel and centralized strategies significantly enhances both firm-level profits and overall system performance.
🔗 Provenance — このレコードを発見したソース
- semanticscholar https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4251154first seen 2026-11-04 05:26:31 · last seen 2026-11-06 05:18:39
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