Split incentives and energy efficiency investment: evidence from the housing market
分割インセンティブとエネルギー効率投資：住宅市場からの証拠 (AI 翻訳)
Erdal Aydın, Piet Eichholtz, Rogier Holtermans, Santiago Bohórquez Correa
🤖 gxceed AI 要約
日本語
本論文は、賃貸住宅市場における家主と入居者の間のインセンティブの不一致がエネルギー効率投資を阻害する問題を実証的に分析。オランダの380万戸の住宅パネルデータを用い、賃貸から持ち家への転換に伴うエネルギー消費の変化をイベントスタディで検証。持ち家移行後、ガス消費が平均2％、最長9年後には最大5％減少することを発見。電気消費には有意な効果は見られず、テナントの家電管理に起因する。
English
This paper empirically analyzes the split incentive problem in rental housing markets, where landlords and tenants have misaligned incentives for energy efficiency investments. Using a comprehensive Dutch panel dataset of 3.8 million homes and a quasi-experimental event study design, it finds that transitioning from rental to owner-occupied status leads to a gradual reduction in natural gas consumption by 2% on average, reaching up to 5% after nine years. No significant effect is found for electricity, as tenants control appliance use. The findings inform policy design for rental housing energy performance.
Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.
📝 gxceed 編集解説 — Why this matters
日本のGX文脈において
日本でも賃貸住宅は多く、家主と入居者のインセンティブ分割問題は重要。本論文の実証結果は、日本の賃貸住宅のエネルギー性能向上政策（例：省エネ改修補助や賃料反映メカニズム）の設計に示唆を与える。
In the global GX context
The split incentive problem is a well-known barrier to energy efficiency globally. This study provides robust causal evidence from the Netherlands, a mature rental market, showing that owner-occupation leads to significant gas savings. These findings are directly relevant to global policy discussions on energy performance standards for rental properties, green leasing, and incentives for landlords under frameworks like the EU's Energy Performance of Buildings Directive.
👥 読者別の含意
🔬研究者:Provides quasi-experimental evidence on the magnitude of split incentives in housing, with implications for energy policy and behavioral economics.
🏢実務担当者:Highlights the importance of aligning landlord-tenant incentives through instruments like green leases or pass-through of efficiency costs.
🏛政策担当者:Supports targeted policies such as mandatory energy audits, subsidies tied to rental property upgrades, or efficiency standards for rental dwellings.
📄 Abstract（原文）
Investments in energy efficiency in the built environment play a crucial role in global efforts to combat climate change. However, a significant obstacle to these investments arises from the differing incentives between landlords and tenants in the housing market. Landlords, who are typically not responsible for utility costs, may choose to invest less in energy efficiency improvements if these investments are not adequately reflected in rents. Our study provides empirical evidence of this market distortion, drawing on a comprehensive panel dataset from the Dutch housing market covering 3.8 million homes. We implement a quasi-experimental event study design that exploits transitions from rental to owner-occupied status while holding both the dwelling and the household constant. This identification strategy enables us to isolate changes in energy use attributable to tenure status. Our findings indicate a gradual decline in natural gas consumption following the transition to home-ownership, with an average reduction of about 2% that increases to as much as 5% nine years after the transition. In electricity consumption, split incentives are less important, given that tenants control the use and stock of their appliances, and we find no effect of changes in tenure status. Together, these findings provide empirical support for the relevance of tenure-based incentives in shaping energy-related decisions and can inform the design of targeted policies aimed at improving the energy performance of the rental housing stock.
🔗 Provenance — このレコードを発見したソース
- openalex https://research.sabanciuniv.edu/id/eprint/53659/first seen 2026-05-15 16:39:28
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