連系した電力市場と炭素市場におけるオンライン意思決定の役割

Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.

🔬研究者:電力・炭素市場の連動メカニズムとオンラインアルゴリズム設計に関心のある研究者に、多時間スケール問題の理論的枠組みを提供。

🏢実務担当者:炭素キャップ下で電力と炭素を同時取引する発電事業者に対し、完全予見なしでも効率的に取引・発電計画を立てる戦略の示唆を与える。

🏛政策担当者:キャップ・アンド・トレード制度設計者に対し、参加者のオンライン行動を考慮した市場メカニズム設計の必要性を提示。

In cap-and-trade carbon markets, tradable carbon allowances are assigned to conventional thermal generators to cap emissions in a compliance period. This paper studies the interaction between electricity and carbon markets through the coupled incentives of generators participating in both. We propose a model capturing multi-timescale dynamics: online trading of electricity and carbon allowances at a fast timescale, while complying with a long-term emission cap. Via optimization decomposition, we show that the intended outcome of generators participating in the two markets is connected to an offline planner’s problem that aims to minimize generation cost under a fixed carbon cap within the compliance period. We design a novel threshold-based online algorithm for cap-constrained generators in the real-time market with a competitive ratio guarantee. The algorithm extends to an online decision framework accommodating various online strategies. However, it suggests that the market outcome could deviate from the desirable planner’s problem, given the problem’s multi-timescale nature. This finding calls for joint electricity-carbon market design over independent operation structures, and highlights the often-overlooked role of cap-constrained generators’ online decision-making. Numerical results validate our analysis and illustrate the different online market participation of generators as well as the potential market deviation with a real-world load pattern. Note to Practitioners—This paper explores the online behavior of generators that participate in both electricity and carbon markets while complying with the long-term carbon emission cap. The proposed online decision-making framework provides a potential strategy for generators to trade carbon allowances and schedule generation efficiently over time, even without perfect foresight of future prices. This becomes increasingly important as cap-and-trade mechanisms are more widely adopted, requiring generators to participate in both markets simultaneously. Our results show that such online behavior—even from price-taking generators—can lead to systematic deviations from ideal market outcomes. These findings offer critical guidance for system operators, market designers, and policymakers, highlighting the need to incorporate participant behavior into the design of market mechanisms under long-term environmental goals. In the future, we will explore mechanism design that accounts for participants’ online behavior in the coupled electricity and carbon markets.

• semanticscholar https://doi.org/10.1109/tase.2026.3737251first seen 2026-10-12 04:58:37