米国における気候政策不確実性と系統的銀行リスクの分解:サステナブルファイナンスへの示唆
Decomposing Climate Policy Uncertainty and Systemic Banking Risk in the United States: Implications for Sustainable Finance (原題)
Sisi Xiong, Weiguo Xiao, Huan Yan
🤖 gxceed AI 要約
日本語
米国の気候政策不確実性を立法・規制・国際公約・市場の4チャネルに分解し、2005〜2024年の月次データでG-SIBや地域銀行の株価リスク・CDSスプレッド・ΔCoVaRへの波及を分析。平時は影響が小さいが、裾野では規制後退リスクが四半期内に波及し、政策紛争の「決着」が「発生」より銀行リスクを動かす。気候ストレステストは紛争局面とテール状態を中心に設計すべきと結論。
English
This study decomposes U.S. climate policy uncertainty into legislative, regulatory, international-commitment and market-based channels, tracing spillovers to G-SIB, regional and broker-dealer bank risk (equity, CDS, ΔCoVaR) over 2005–2024. Effects are negligible in normal months but emerge in the tails within a quarter, with regulatory reversal risk and contested legislation dominating. Climate stress scenarios should center on contestation episodes and tail states.
Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.
📝 gxceed 編集解説 — Why this matters
日本のGX文脈において
気候政策の予見可能性が金融安定とトランジションファイナンスの前提になる点は、SSBJ・有報開示や国内銀行の気候リスク管理を考える日本企業・金融機関にも示唆的。政策の「後退リスク」をリスク要因として捉える視点は日本では相対的に手薄。
In the global GX context
Adds a policy-uncertainty decomposition to the global climate-risk literature relevant to TCFD/ISSB scenario analysis and central-bank climate stress testing, arguing that contestation and tail states—not average uncertainty—should drive scenario design.
👥 読者別の含意
🔬研究者:気候政策不確実性を単一指数ではなくチャネル別・分位点別に扱う手法は、気候リスクの実証研究設計の参考になる。
🏢実務担当者:銀行・企業の気候リスク開示やシナリオ分析で、政策の後退・紛争局面をテールリスクとして組み込む根拠を提供。
🏛政策担当者:気候政策の予見可能性と耐久性が金融安定に寄与することを示し、政策設計・気候ストレステストの焦点設定に示唆。
📄 Abstract(原文)
Climate policy uncertainty is usually measured as a single index, which cannot tell supervisors whether risk to banks comes from Congress, federal agencies, or international commitments. This study separates these channels. Because banks provide much of the credit needed for the low-carbon transition, knowing where this risk comes from matters for sustainable finance as well as for financial stability. We build legislative and regulatory indices that count formal attempts to block, delay, or reverse existing U.S. climate policy, alongside an international-commitment index and a market-based transition uncertainty measure. Using monthly data from January 2005 to December 2024, a quantile VAR with frequency decomposition, a time-varying model, and bias-corrected bootstrap inference, we trace spillovers to G-SIB, regional and broker-dealer equity risk, G-SIB CDS spreads, and ΔCoVaR. In normal months, climate policy uncertainty has little measurable effect on bank risk once broader financial conditions are controlled for. Spillovers emerge in the tails and build within a quarter. Regulatory reversal risk outweighs the international and market channels when bank risk rises fastest, but no more than contested legislation does. In the tails, the resolution of policy fights moves bank risk more than their outbreak, and legislative spillovers disappear when contested bills are replaced by the volume of climate legislation. Climate stress scenarios should therefore center on contestation episodes and tail states. Because a stable banking system is needed to fund the transition, the findings show that predictable and durable climate policy supports both financial stability and sustainable development.
🔗 Provenance — このレコードを発見したソース
- openalex https://doi.org/10.3390/su182110864first seen 2026-10-29 05:02:16 · last seen 2026-11-06 05:03:33
- semanticscholar https://doi.org/10.3390/su182110864first seen 2026-11-01 05:33:31 · last seen 2026-11-06 05:33:23
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