A game theory approach to carbon pricing and subsidies for efficient clean energy deployment
効率的なクリーンエネルギー導入のための炭素価格と補助金に関するゲーム理論アプローチ (AI 翻訳)
Salah Salimian, Sattar Salimian
🤖 gxceed AI 要約
日本語
本研究はゲーム理論を用いて、炭素価格と補助金の相互作用を分析する二段階モデルを構築。均衡解から、政策効果は市場構造や技術効率に依存し、炭素価格のみでは不十分な場合に補助金が必要となることを示す。政策提言として、信頼性のある炭素価格と成果連動型補助金の組み合わせを推奨。
English
This study uses a game-theoretic model to analyze the interaction between carbon pricing and subsidies for clean energy deployment. It finds that optimal policy depends on market structure and technology efficacy, and that subsidies are needed when carbon pricing alone is insufficient. The key recommendation is to combine credible carbon pricing with performance-based subsidies.
Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.
📝 gxceed 編集解説 — Why this matters
日本のGX文脈において
日本のGX政策では、炭素価格（GX-ETSなど）と補助金（GX投資促進策）の適切な組み合わせが重要。本モデルはその理論的根拠を提供し、政策設計の最適化に示唆を与える。
In the global GX context
Globally, this paper contributes to the debate on optimal carbon pricing design, particularly the role of complementary subsidies. It offers a theoretical framework relevant to jurisdictions like the EU ETS or emerging carbon pricing schemes.
👥 読者別の含意
🔬研究者:Provides a rigorous game-theoretic framework for analyzing policy mixes in clean energy deployment.
🏢実務担当者:Can support sustainability teams in modeling the impact of carbon pricing and subsidy scenarios on investment decisions.
🏛政策担当者:Offers guidance on when to combine carbon pricing with subsidies to achieve efficient clean energy deployment.
📄 Abstract（原文）
Abstract Climate change and the global transition to low-carbon energy represent pressing economic and environmental challenges that require effective policy interventions. Understanding how to design instruments that align private incentives with societal objectives is crucial, highlighting the importance of investigating the interaction between carbon pricing and subsidies for clean energy deployment. This study employs a game-theoretic, mechanism-design framework to develop a two-stage analytical model of strategic interaction, in which a regulator sets carbon prices and complementary subsidies while firms optimally choose abatement levels and clean energy investments; the model is solved through backward induction to derive closed-form Nash equilibrium strategies. The analysis is based on a theoretical model, which provides closed-form solutions for equilibrium strategies. Analytical results reveal how policy effectiveness depends on market structure, technology efficacy, and damage sensitivity, and identify the Nash equilibrium conditions under which carbon pricing alone is sufficient or when additional subsidies are required. The primary policy recommendation emphasizes the combination of credible carbon pricing with targeted, performance-based subsidies, ensuring efficient deployment of clean technologies, accounting for strategic behavior, informational constraints, and political feasibility, and providing actionable guidance for policymakers committed to sustainable development objectives.
🔗 Provenance — このレコードを発見したソース
- crossref https://doi.org/10.1186/s43093-026-00790-0first seen 2026-05-14 23:10:34
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