炭素排出権取引と政府補助金は炭素削減を促進し、環境影響を緩和できるか？
Can the carbon cap-and-trade and government subsidies drive carbon abatement and mitigate environmental impacts? (原題)
Lili Lu
🤖 gxceed AI 要約
日本語
本論文は、製造業の脱炭素化における炭素排出権取引と政府補助金の効果を、二段階の低炭素サプライチェーンゲームモデルを用いて分析する。消費者のグリーン選好が強い場合、排出権取引は企業の収益性と炭素削減効果の両方で優れるが、製造業者向け補助金は利益追求に偏り、削減効果は限定的である。社会的厚生は消費者の低炭素需要の強さに依存し、選好が高ければ排出権取引が優位になる。
English
This paper develops a two-echelon low-carbon supply chain game model to analyze the effects of carbon cap-and-trade and government subsidies on manufacturing decarbonization. It finds that cap-and-trade maximizes profitability and carbon reduction when consumer green preferences are strong, while subsidies mainly serve profit motives with limited abatement. Social welfare depends on the intensity of low-carbon demand, with cap-and-trade outperforming when preferences are high.
Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.
📝 gxceed 編集解説 — Why this matters
日本のGX文脈において
日本では、GX推進法やカーボンプライシングの導入が検討されており、本論文の知見は政策設計や企業のサプライチェーン戦略に示唆を与える。特に、消費者の環境意識が高まる中で、排出権取引の有効性が増すという結果は、日本のGX政策に参考になる。
In the global GX context
This paper contributes to the global discourse on carbon pricing and supply chain decarbonization, offering insights for policymakers and firms under evolving disclosure regimes like ISSB and CSRD. It highlights the importance of consumer preferences in determining the effectiveness of policy instruments, relevant for designing transition finance and carbon market mechanisms.
👥 読者別の含意
🔬研究者:Provides a game-theoretic framework for analyzing policy instruments in low-carbon supply chains, useful for further empirical or theoretical work.
🏢実務担当者:Offers insights into how carbon pricing and subsidies affect supply chain profitability and emission reduction, informing corporate strategy under carbon regulations.
🏛政策担当者:Highlights conditions under which cap-and-trade outperforms subsidies, guiding policy design for industrial decarbonization.
📄 Abstract（原文）
Global governments and industrial enterprises have increasingly prioritized carbon mitigation and ecological conservation, prompting the rollout of diverse regulatory and fiscal tools to drive manufacturing decarbonization. This paper establishes a two-echelon low-carbon supply chain game framework to quantify how distinct policy interventions reshape manufacturers' clean technology investment and emission-cutting behaviors. Core analytical findings are as follows: When consumers exhibit strong green consumption preferences, the carbon cap-and-trade regime delivers maximized profitability for both upstream manufacturers and downstream retailers, alongside superior carbon reduction performance and minimized ecological harm. Nevertheless, fiscal subsidies targeting manufacturers primarily serve profit-maximizing motives rather than robust emission abatement, which implies trading mechanisms may underperform in curbing industrial carbon outputs. Social welfare dynamics hinge on the intensity of public low-carbon demand: emission trading outperforms alternatives once consumer green preference crosses a critical threshold, while manufacturer-specific fiscal incentives yield more favorable aggregate social welfare in most practical scenarios.
🔗 Provenance — このレコードを発見したソース
- openalex https://doi.org/10.54254/2977-5701/2026.36212first seen 2026-08-20 04:40:48
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