The Tiered Clinching Auction with Applications to Carbon Offset Markets
カーボンオフセット市場への応用を備えた階層的クリンチングオークション (AI 翻訳)
Tessa Davis, Agnes Totschnig, A. Vetta
🤖 gxceed AI 要約
日本語
この論文は、カーボンオフセット市場の流動性不足に対処するための昇順オークションメカニズムを提案します。階層的品質のアイテムに一般化されたクリンチングオークションを導入し、入札者が最小品質レベルを要求する場合に効率的な結果とVCG価格を達成します。このメカニズムは、オフセット市場だけでなく、ホテル予約やチケット販売などにも応用可能です。
English
This paper proposes an ascending auction mechanism to address low liquidity in carbon offset markets. It generalizes Ausubel's clinching auction to tiered-quality items, achieving efficient outcomes and VCG pricing when bidders have minimum quality thresholds. The mechanism is applicable beyond offsets to hotel bookings, ticketing, and sponsored search.
Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.
📝 gxceed 編集解説 — Why this matters
日本のGX文脈において
日本では、カーボンオフセット市場の整備が進んでおり、J-クレジット制度などが存在しますが、流動性の課題は共通です。本論文のメカニズムは、日本市場におけるクレジット取引の効率化に示唆を与える可能性があります。
In the global GX context
Globally, voluntary carbon offset markets suffer from fragmentation and low liquidity. This auction mechanism offers a theoretically grounded approach to improve price discovery and allocation efficiency, which could inform market design in emerging compliance and voluntary carbon markets.
👥 読者別の含意
🔬研究者:This paper provides a novel mechanism design for tiered-quality goods with applications to carbon offset markets, offering theoretical foundations for efficient market clearing.
🏢実務担当者:Carbon market operators and exchanges could explore this auction mechanism to increase liquidity and transparency in offset trading.
🏛政策担当者:Regulators overseeing carbon offset markets may consider this mechanism as a blueprint for improving market infrastructure and price signaling.
📄 Abstract（原文）
Voluntary carbon offsetting is a strategy which has been pursued globally by corporations to reduce their effective carbon emissions. Carbon offset markets currently suffer from low liquidity: offsets are highly heterogeneous, the landscape of accreditation is fragmented, and the market lacks a centralized trading infrastructure which would provide clear demand and price signaling to producers and buyers of offsets. In this paper, we propose an ascending auction mechanism which can be applied to the sale of carbon offsets. It generalizes Ausubel's clinching auction to a setting with items of tiered quality. The central idea behind the clinching mechanism is that bidders are allocated items when their opponents'demand drops below the supply. This is generalized to multiple nested submarkets where clinching can occur in the tiered case. Assuming that bidders have a minimum quality level that they will accept but are indifferent to quality beyond that, along with having decreasing marginal utility, we obtain that the auction generates the efficient outcome and charges VCG prices. As a result, sincere bidding is a weakly dominant strategy given private values. Moreover, the auction can be implemented in polynomial time. Beyond offset markets, this auction can be applied to any market where items can be ordered on a scale and bidders have a cutoff point for desiring items on the scale, such as hotel room bookings, concert ticketing and sponsored search auctions.
🔗 Provenance — このレコードを発見したソース
- semanticscholar https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/c5d48f949d1808b845cd70754661b45d51953b31first seen 2026-07-29 05:36:07
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