Multi-Market Joint Trading of Distributed Resource Aggregators Considering a Carbon–Green Certificate Linkage Mechanism

Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.

🔬研究者:本論文は複数市場におけるアグリゲーターの戦略的入札に関する最適化フレームワークを提供し、エネルギー経済学や市場設計の研究者に有用。

🏢実務担当者:アグリゲーター事業者は提案モデルを応用し、自社のポートフォリオ最適化や複数市場参加戦略の策定に活用できる。

🏛政策担当者:炭素市場とグリーン証書市場の連携メカニズム設計において、上限オフセット比率の設定は実践的な指針となる。

To address the coupling among bidding decisions, resource allocation, and coordinated utilization of environmental rights for distributed resource aggregators in multiple markets, including the energy market, peak regulation ancillary service market, carbon trading market, and tradable green certificate market, this paper proposes a bi-level optimization model for multi-market joint trading considering a limited carbon–green certificate linkage mechanism. First, a quantitative mapping relationship between the emission reduction attribute of surplus green certificates and carbon emission reduction is established, and an upper limit constraint on the offset ratio is introduced to describe the limited conversion of green certificate environmental attributes into carbon emission reduction value. Second, an upper-level bidding model for the distributed resource aggregator is constructed, aiming at profit maximization while considering revenues from the energy, peak regulation ancillary service, carbon trading, and green certificate markets, as well as the operational constraints of gas turbines, energy storage, and flexible loads. This model characterizes the aggregator’s joint bidding strategy and internal resource coordination. Then, a lower-level unified market clearing model is developed to minimize system operating cost and simulate the segmented bidding and unified clearing process of the aggregator, wind power, and thermal power units in the energy and peak regulation ancillary service markets. Finally, the bi-level model is transformed into a solvable single-level model using the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions and the Big-M method, and case studies are conducted to verify its effectiveness. The numerical results show that under the complete multi-market mechanism, the distributed resource aggregator (DRA) obtains a net profit of 2245.03 yuan, which is higher than 1450.33 yuan in the scenario without the carbon–green certificate mechanism and 773.48 yuan in the energy-only scenario. The wind curtailment rate decreases from 8.53% in the energy-only scenario to 2.71%, and the carbon emissions accounted for within the DRA boundary are reduced to 2865.40 kg. Although the price-taker scenario obtains a slightly higher net profit of 2300.20 yuan, its average regulation price reaches 455.20 yuan/MWh, compared with 412.50 yuan/MWh under the proposed model, indicating that the proposed strategy achieves a better balance between aggregator revenue and system-side regulation cost.

• openalex https://doi.org/10.3390/su18147405first seen 2026-07-22 04:57:04