Use of system dynamics model for stability analysis of contractor and government environmental strategies for transportation infrastructure
交通インフラにおける請負業者と政府の環境戦略の安定性分析のためのシステムダイナミクスモデルの使用 (AI 翻訳)
Yao Zhang, Dan Zhang, Yujie Zhang, Zhuoqun Du
🤖 gxceed AI 要約
日本語
本研究は、交通インフラ開発における請負業者と規制当局の相互作用を進化ゲーム理論とシステムダイナミクスを用いてモデル化し、罰則と公的報告制度の効果を分析した。結果、純粋戦略は進化的安定性を達成できず、混合戦略は公的報告システムの下でのみ条件付きで安定することが示された。また、金銭的罰則よりも透明性のある監視システムが長期的なコンプライアンスに効果的である。
English
This study uses evolutionary game theory and system dynamics to model interactions between contractors and regulators in transportation infrastructure. It finds that pure strategies are never stable, mixed strategies are stable only with public reporting, and transparent monitoring outperforms penalties for long-term compliance.
Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.
📝 gxceed 編集解説 — Why this matters
日本のGX文脈において
日本では国土交通省が公共工事の環境配慮を推進しており、本論文の知見は請負業者のコンプライアンス制度設計、特に公的報告システムの強化に示唆を与える。また、SSBJや有報における環境情報開示とも関連し、監視の透明性が重要であることを示す。
In the global GX context
Globally, this paper contributes to the discourse on regulatory design for sustainable infrastructure. The finding that transparency mechanisms sustain compliance better than penalties aligns with ISSB’s emphasis on disclosure and stakeholder monitoring, offering insights for environmental regulation worldwide.
👥 読者別の含意
🔬研究者:Evolutionary game theory and system dynamics integration provides a novel framework for analyzing regulatory compliance in infrastructure.
🏢実務担当者:Construction firms can use the insights to prioritize transparent reporting over merely avoiding penalties.
🏛政策担当者:Policymakers should invest in public reporting systems to enforce sustainable practices in infrastructure projects.
📄 Abstract（原文）
This study aims to examine the interplay between infrastructure development and environmental protection, focusing on how governmental regulations shape contractor behavior and exploring policy mechanisms that reconcile economic and ecological objectives. An integrated framework combining evolutionary game theory and system dynamics simulation models the interactions between contractors and regulatory agencies. Computational experiments assess the effects of penalties and public reporting systems on behavioral stability. Analysis reveals three significant outcomes: (1) Pure strategy solutions fail to achieve evolutionary stability regardless of parameter configurations; (2) Mixed strategy equilibria demonstrate conditional stability, particularly when public reporting systems are operational; (3) While both financial penalties and public disclosure influence short-term behavior modification, only robust public monitoring systems generate sustainable compliance patterns over extended periods. The findings deepen understanding of how government–contractor interactions shape sustainable infrastructure development, emphasizing the pivotal role of regulatory design and behavioral adaptation in achieving enduring environmental and economic balance. Policymakers should prioritize public reporting and strengthen monitoring systems to align contractor incentives with ecological goals. Combining penalty mechanisms with transparent oversight offers a coherent and lasting approach to advancing green construction and maintaining regulatory compliance. This study proposes a novel framework integrating evolutionary game theory with system dynamics, rarely applied in infrastructure governance. It captures dynamic feedback between contractors and regulators and shows that transparency mechanisms outperform punitive measures in sustaining compliance, offering clear guidance for policy optimization.
🔗 Provenance — このレコードを発見したソース
- semanticscholar https://doi.org/10.1108/jedt-05-2025-0224first seen 2026-07-18 08:33:54
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