Incentives Analysis for Carbon Emission Reduction in Public Buildings Under Emission Trading Scheme
排出権取引制度下における公共建築物の炭素排出削減のインセンティブ分析 (AI 翻訳)
Weina Zhu, Xiaomeng Gao, Chengshuang Sun, Kaicheng Shen, Zhi Sun
🤖 gxceed AI 要約
日本語
中国の公共建築物の炭素排出削減における排出権取引制度（ETS）のインセンティブメカニズムを進化ゲームモデルで分析。政府と企業の行動進化を示し、報奨と罰則の役割、炭素クォータ価格の影響を明らかに。実行可能な枠組みを提案。
English
This paper analyzes the incentive mechanism of China's emission trading scheme for public building carbon reduction using an evolutionary game model. It finds four evolutionary stages and shows that rewards/penalties and carbon quota prices are key drivers. A practical implementation framework is proposed for local governments.
Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.
📝 gxceed 編集解説 — Why this matters
日本のGX文脈において
日本の排出権取引制度や建築物の省エネ政策にも示唆を与える。特に公共建築物の炭素削減インセンティブ設計に参考となる。
In the global GX context
This paper offers a model for building sector ETS incentives, relevant for global policymakers designing carbon markets. It emphasizes the interplay of government regulation and market mechanisms.
👥 読者別の含意
🔬研究者:Useful for scholars studying ETS design and building energy policy, especially the behavioral modeling of enterprises.
🏢実務担当者:Building sector sustainability teams can learn about incentive mechanisms to enhance carbon reduction efforts.
🏛政策担当者:Provides a framework for designing targeted carbon reduction policies in the building sector under emissions trading.
📄 Abstract（原文）
Emission trading scheme (ETS) promotes carbon emission reductions by leveraging market incentives for enterprises. However, the lack of enthusiasm among enterprises in China’s building carbon emission trading market signals some deficiencies in its incentive mechanism. This study establishes an evolutionary game model involving three parties, including the government and heterogeneous enterprises, to explore the behavioral evolution process of multiple game players and improve the incentive mechanism for carbon emission reduction. The results demonstrate that the development path of enterprises’ participation in the emission trading market undergoes four evolutionary stages: the initial stage, the transitional stage, the growth stage and the mature stage. Also, the results of sensitivity analysis demonstrate that (1) rewards and penalties are the tools for government regulation and market incentives; (2) enterprises are not very enthusiastic about participating in carbon trading activities and adopting carbon-reduction technologies; (3) the rise in carbon quota trading prices can prompt enterprises to actively reduce carbon emissions. Based on the results, this study proposes an executable implementation framework for the carbon-reduction incentive mechanism of public buildings under ETS, providing practical guidance for local governments to formulate and implement targeted carbon-reduction policies, aiming to boost the enthusiasm of building enterprises for low-carbon behaviors and decision-making choices.
🔗 Provenance — このレコードを発見したソース
- openalex https://doi.org/10.3390/buildings16112246first seen 2026-06-04 04:52:50
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