電力・炭素市場の連動下における発電事業者の均衡志向型戦略入札

Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.

🔬研究者:電力・炭素市場の連動下での均衡入札をゲーム理論で定式化した分析枠組みを提供する。

🏢実務担当者:炭素コストを織り込んだ発電・入札戦略の立案や、炭素価格変動リスクの評価に活用できる。

🏛政策担当者:電力市場と排出量取引制度の連動設計や、炭素価格が電力価格に与える影響の検討に示唆を与える。

With the deepening integration of electricity markets and carbon trading mechanisms, generation companies are required to coordinate profit-driven bidding decisions with emission-related cost constraints. This paper investigates the strategic bidding behavior of generation companies in a coupled electricity-carbon market environment. A non-cooperative game model is developed to describe the interactions among heterogeneous generation companies participating simultaneously in electricity transactions and carbon allowance trading. In the proposed framework, each company maximizes its own profit under generation capacity limits, carbon emission constraints, and market-clearing conditions. An iterative best-response procedure is adopted to simulate the adjustment of generation output, carbon emissions, and market prices until an equilibrium state is reached. Case studies over a 24-hour trading horizon show that generation companies may exhibit differentiated strategic preferences: one company tends to adopt a conservative strategy that balances operating cost and carbon emission control, while another pursues more aggressive output expansion to capture market revenue during high-demand periods. The results also indicate that electricity prices and carbon prices are closely correlated, especially during peak-load hours, and that repeated market interaction enables bidding strategies to converge toward stable equilibrium decisions. The proposed model provides a useful analytical basis for understanding strategic bidding behavior under coupled electricity-carbon market mechanisms.

• semanticscholar https://doi.org/10.1109/icepae71371.2026.11688803first seen 2026-09-26 05:05:14 · last seen 2026-09-29 05:14:07