需要不確実性下における電力購入契約の価格設定：コスト回収型 vs. 余剰分配型
Pricing Power Purchase Agreements Under Demand Uncertainty: Cost-Recovery vs. Surplus-Sharing (原題)
Yutaro Oga, Kazuya Ito, R. Takashima
🤖 gxceed AI 要約
日本語
本研究は仮想PPAの理論モデルを構築し、需要不確実性下でコスト回収型価格設定と余剰分配型価格設定を比較する。企業の契約採用タイミングを最適停止問題としてモデル化し、固定契約価格をLCOEベースのコスト回収条件または加重ナッシュ交渉解で決定する。分析の結果、価格設定ルールの選択が均衡契約価格だけでなく企業の最適採用閾値にも影響を与えることを示す。数値結果は両均衡の差が市場不確実性と交渉力に依存することを示唆する。
English
This study develops a theoretical framework for virtual PPAs, comparing cost-recovery pricing and surplus-sharing pricing under demand uncertainty. The firm's contract adoption timing is modeled as an optimal stopping problem, with the fixed price set by either an LCOE-based cost-recovery condition or a weighted Nash bargaining solution. Results show that the pricing rule affects both the equilibrium contract price and the firm's optimal adoption threshold, with the gap between equilibria varying with market uncertainty and bargaining power.
Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.
📝 gxceed 編集解説 — Why this matters
日本のGX文脈において
日本では企業の再エネ調達が拡大する中、PPA価格の妥当性や契約タイミングの判断は実務者にとって重要課題である。本論文は価格設定ルールが採用タイミングに与える影響を理論的に示し、調達戦略の意思決定に示唆を与える。
In the global GX context
As corporate renewable procurement via PPAs grows globally, understanding how pricing rules affect contract adoption timing is relevant for both buyers and sellers. The paper contributes to the literature on PPA pricing by incorporating bargaining and uncertainty, which is pertinent to transition finance and corporate decarbonization strategies.
👥 読者別の含意
🔬研究者:PPA価格理論におけるコスト回収型と余剰分配型の比較分析を提供し、不確実性下の契約採用タイミングの理論的枠組みを示す。
🏢実務担当者:PPA契約の価格設定が採用タイミングに影響することを理解し、調達戦略の検討に活用できる。
🏛政策担当者:再エネ調達促進のためのPPA市場設計において、価格設定ルールの影響を考慮する必要性を示唆する。
📄 Abstract（原文）
Power purchase agreements (PPAs) have become an important instrument for corporate renewable electricity procurement and long-term electricity price risk management. Existing studies often determine PPA prices using levelized-cost-based frameworks, which provide a useful benchmark for renewable investment recovery. However, a cost-recovery rule does not fully capture how contractual surplus is allocated between the producer and the buyer, nor does it explain how the pricing rule affects contract adoption timing under uncertainty. This study develops a theoretical framework for virtual PPAs and compares two pricing structures under demand uncertainty: cost-recovery pricing and surplus-sharing pricing. The firm's contract adoption decision is modeled as an optimal timing problem under an exogenous demand shock, while the fixed contract price is determined either by an LCOE-based cost-recovery condition or by a weighted Nash bargaining solution. The model also incorporates a CSR-related premium associated with renewable electricity adoption. The analysis indicates that the choice between cost-recovery and surplus-sharing pricing affects not only the equilibrium fixed contract price but also the firm's optimal adoption threshold. The numerical results further suggest that the difference between the two equilibria varies with market uncertainty and bargaining power. These results imply that PPA pricing rules should be evaluated not only as price-setting mechanisms but also as determinants of contract adoption timing under uncertainty.
🔗 Provenance — このレコードを発見したソース
- semanticscholar https://doi.org/10.1109/appeec67771.2026.11750190first seen 2026-11-06 05:50:59
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