India's Carbon Market Architecture for the Refinery Sector: A Comparative Analysis Using the Borenstein-Kellogg Framework
インドの製油所部門における炭素市場アーキテクチャ：Borenstein-Kelloggフレームワークを用いた比較分析 (AI 翻訳)
Bosco Chiramel
🤖 gxceed AI 要約
日本語
インドが2025年度に開始した炭素クレジット取引制度（CCTS）を、石油精製部門に焦点を当てて分析。Borenstein-Kelloggの枠組みを用い、22製油所の部分均衡モデルを構築。CCTSの均衡価格は1,059ルピー/tCO2で、年間123.4万tCO2の削減を達成し、限界削減費用はほぼファーストベストの炭素税と同等。PATからCCTSへの移行は厚生を改善し、RPOとの重複による二重規制の問題を指摘。政策提言として、CCTSへの完全移行、検証済みベースラインの使用、RPOとの重複解消を提案。
English
This paper analyzes India's Carbon Credit Trading Scheme (CCTS) for the refinery sector using the Borenstein-Kellogg framework. A partial equilibrium model of 22 refineries shows the CCTS equilibrium price of Rs 1,059/tCO2 achieves 1,234 ktCO2 annual abatement at a marginal cost nearly equivalent to a first-best carbon tax. The PAT-to-CCTS transition improves welfare, and the RPO-CCTS overlap creates double regulation. Recommendations include full transition to CCTS, verified baselines, and resolving RPO overlap.
Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.
📝 gxceed 編集解説 — Why this matters
日本のGX文脈において
日本では2026年度にSSBJ開示が始まり、カーボンプライシング（GX-ETS）の本格稼働が迫る。本論文の制度比較分析は、日本のGX-ETS設計（ベースライン設定、重複規制回避）に示唆を与える。特に、複数制度の重複による非効率性の指摘は、日本の省エネ法とGX-ETSの整合性を検討する上で参考になる。
In the global GX context
As global carbon markets expand, this paper offers a rigorous comparative framework for assessing cap-and-trade vs. energy efficiency schemes. The finding that cap stringency matters more than instrument type informs ISSB-aligned transition planning and carbon pricing debates. The RPO-CCTS overlap analysis provides lessons for jurisdictions with overlapping climate policies.
👥 読者別の含意
🔬研究者:Provides a novel application of the Borenstein-Kellogg framework to a developing country's carbon market, with detailed welfare comparisons.
🏢実務担当者:Offers insights into carbon market design and compliance strategies for refineries, relevant for companies facing similar transitions.
🏛政策担当者:Highlights the importance of cap stringency and avoiding policy overlaps, directly applicable to designing effective carbon pricing.
📄 Abstract（原文）
India launched its Carbon Credit Trading Scheme (CCTS) in FY2025-26, transitioning the petroleum refinery sector from the Perform, Achieve and Trade (PAT) energy efficiency scheme to a greenhouse gas intensity-based cap-and-trade system. This paper applies the comparative welfare framework of Borenstein and Kellogg (2023) to India's unique four-instrument carbon market architecture. Using public data from IEX, BEE, PPAC, and CEA, we build a partial equilibrium model covering all 22 Indian petroleum refineries (256.8 MMTPA capacity, 41.1 MtCO2 baseline). We find that the CCTS equilibrium Carbon Credit Certificate (CCC) price of Rs 1,059 per tonne CO2 achieves 1,234 ktCO2 of annual abatement at a marginal abatement cost of Rs 65 croreessentially equivalent to a first-best carbon tax (Rs 66 crore). The PAT-to-CCTS transition improves welfare: CCTS achieves 37 percent more abatement than PAT at lower cost per tonne (Rs 529 vs Rs 761 per tCO2). The RPO delivers the largest abatement (2,338 ktCO2) at the lowest per-tonne cost (Rs 461 per tCO2) but operates on the electricity margin rather than the process fuel margin, creating double regulation when overlaid with CCTS. Sensitivity analysis identifies CCTS cap stringency-not instrument type-as the dominant welfare determinant. Three policy recommendations follow: proceed with the CCTS transition without retaining parallel PAT obligations; base CCTS targets on verified FY2023-24 GHG intensity baselines; and resolve the RPO-CCTS overlap by exempting CCTS-obligated refineries from RPO for covered processes.
🔗 Provenance — このレコードを発見したソース
- semanticscholar https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.6501409first seen 2026-05-15 17:09:09 · last seen 2026-08-02 06:14:23
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