世界気候銀行は救世主となるか？取引費用と気候的取引アプローチ
A world climate bank to the rescue? Transaction costs and the climate bargain approach (原題)
Richard Endörfer
🤖 gxceed AI 要約
日本語
BroomeとFoleyが提唱する「気候的取引」アプローチを検討する。世代間・世代内のパレート改善的取引を「世界気候銀行」で仲介する構想に対し、著者は取引費用の観点から批判を加える。取引費用を考慮すれば、有効な気候政策は勝者と敗者を生むため、不平等削減を伴う政策が必要になると論じる。
English
This paper critiques Broome and Foley's 'climate bargain' approach, which envisions a World Climate Bank mediating a Pareto-improving deal between current emitters and future generations. Drawing on externality economics, the author argues that transaction costs make such bargains unlikely, so effective climate policy will create losers as well as winners. Consequently, reducing inequality may be a prerequisite for politically feasible climate action.
Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.
📝 gxceed 編集解説 — Why this matters
日本のGX文脈において
気候政策の分配的正義と政治実現可能性を扱う理論的議論であり、日本固有の文脈への直接的な示唆は限定的。ただし、カーボンプライシングや移行政策の負担配分を検討する際の倫理的枠組みとして、政策立案者・研究者にとって参考になり得る。
In the global GX context
This contributes to global debates on the political economy of climate policy and just transition, relevant to how carbon pricing, transition finance, and loss-and-damage mechanisms allocate costs. It challenges the assumption that climate action can be universally Pareto-improving, a key premise in international climate negotiations and disclosure-driven transition planning.
👥 読者別の含意
🔬研究者:気候倫理・環境経済学における分配的正義と取引費用の理論的接点を深める視点を提供する。
🏛政策担当者:実効的な気候政策は敗者を生むという前提に立ち、不平等削減を組み込んだ政策設計の必要性を示唆する。
📄 Abstract（原文）
In this article, I discuss what I call the “climate bargain” approach to climate ethics as put forward by Broome and Foley. The central idea of this approach is that if the energy transition is to succeed, it must do so by enabling a win-win, or Pareto-improving, bargain between the current emitters of greenhouse gases and future generations, mediated via a “World Climate Bank.” I argue here that Broome and Foley's analysis ignores central insights in the economic literature on externalities. In particular, they fail to appreciate the importance of transaction costs, which suggest that an intragenerational Pareto-improving bargain is highly unlikely to succeed. We hence should expect that any effective climate policy approach will not only create winners, but also losers. As a result, we face a choice: Should the resulting losses be allocated such that inequality is increased or reduced? Broome and Foley argue against inequality-reducing climate policy, since they believe that any such policy will jeopardize the political feasibility of dealing with climate change. I argue contra Broome and Foley that once we take transaction costs explicitly into consideration, we have good reason to believe that effective climate policy will likely require us to reduce inequality.
🔗 Provenance — このレコードを発見したソース
- openalex https://doi.org/10.1177/1470594x261480649first seen 2026-09-20 04:32:28
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