Regulatory uncertainty under fragmented authoritarianism: decarbonization challenges in China’s national emissions trading scheme
分断された権威主義下の規制の不確実性：中国全国排出量取引制度における脱炭素化の課題 (AI 翻訳)
Sijin Lai
🤖 gxceed AI 要約
日本語
本論文は、中国全国排出量取引制度（NCETS）が大規模脱炭素投資を動員できる価格シグナルを生成できない理由を分析する。既存研究が技術的ルール設計に焦点を当てるのに対し、本論文は分断された権威主義の枠組みから、中央省庁間の相互作用や利害対立が排出枠の希少性と規制の安定性を損ない、投資インセンティブを弱めていると論じる。
English
This paper analyzes why China's national carbon emissions trading scheme (NCETS) fails to generate a price signal that can mobilize large-scale decarbonization investment. It argues that fragmented authoritarianism, characterized by opaque stakeholder-driven decision-making and divergent departmental interests, deprioritizes allowance scarcity and regulatory stability, thereby reducing investment incentives.
Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.
📝 gxceed 編集解説 — Why this matters
日本のGX文脈において
日本のGX-ETSやカーボンプライシング政策設計において、中央省庁間の調整や利害調整の重要性を示唆する。中国ETSの制度的課題から、日本が同様の失敗を回避するための教訓を得られる。
In the global GX context
This paper provides a novel institutional analysis of the world's largest carbon market, highlighting that technical design alone is insufficient. It offers critical insights for global ETS design, especially regarding governance structures and interaction among regulatory agencies, relevant for the EU ETS, RGGI, and emerging markets.
👥 読者別の含意
🔬研究者:Provides a framework (fragmented authoritarianism) to analyze ETS underperformance beyond technical design, useful for comparative carbon market studies.
🏢実務担当者:Highlights the risk of regulatory uncertainty in China's ETS, affecting investment decisions for companies operating in China or relying on Chinese offsets.
🏛政策担当者:Emphasizes the need for centralized coordination and transparent rulemaking to ensure allowance scarcity and market stability in emissions trading systems.
📄 Abstract（原文）
Abstract China’s national carbon emissions trading scheme (NCETS) faces persistent challenges in generating a price signal capable of mobilizing large-scale decarbonization investment. Existing scholarship’s emphasis on technical rule design has limited its ability to explain this underperformance, leading scholars to conflate early-stage capacity constraints with structural limitations and to overlook interactions among central government agencies. This article situates the NCETS within China’s environmental governance framework and examines the institutions that shape decision-making, the structure of their interactions, and how this governance configuration weakens the NCETS’s capacity to generate incentives for low-carbon investment. It argues that fragmented authoritarianism has displaced both environmental authoritarianism and environmental federalism in Chinese emissions trading regulation and practice. The opaque, stakeholder-driven decision-making process embedded in the legal framework, together with asymmetries in bargaining power and divergent departmental interests, deprioritizes allowance scarcity and regulatory stability, thereby reducing investment incentives under the NCETS.
🔗 Provenance — このレコードを発見したソース
- crossref https://doi.org/10.1093/jel/eqag023first seen 2026-07-18 09:11:12
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