Information Sharing and Decarbonization in Eco-conscious Etailing Systems

Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.

🔬研究者:For researchers, this model reveals how dual-purpose objectives reshape information-sharing incentives in supply chains.

🏢実務担当者:Practitioners can use these insights to design information-sharing agreements that align pricing and abatement decisions with environmental goals.

🏛政策担当者:Policymakers should consider channel structure and ESG alignment when crafting supply chain disclosure regulations.

In the context of global sustainability mandates, supply chain firms are increasingly balancing traditional profit objectives with environmental accountability, particularly around carbon emissions. Major e-commerce platforms such as JD.com and Amazon have responded by urging their suppliers to intensify efforts to decarbonize during the production processes. This paper examines whether the growing emphasis on carbon performance creates a strategic incentive for the platform to share demand information with its suppliers. Specifically, we consider an eco-conscious e-tailing supply chain that consists of a platform and a single manufacturer. The platform privately observes a demand signal, the manufacturer can devote effort to reduce carbon emissions, with both parties being dual-purpose decision makers who trade off profit against total emissions. We examine two prevalent channel structures: in a resale model, the manufacturer sets a wholesale price and the platform sets the retail price, and in the agency model, the manufacturer sets the retail price and pays the platform a commission. We study the equilibrium pricing and emission reduction effort decisions for the scenarios in the presence and absence of information sharing. Our analysis shows that environmental objectives reshape sharing incentives through channel control rights. In the resale model, when the two parties’ environmental concerns are sufficiently strong and well aligned, information sharing becomes optimal for the platform: sharing improves demand-contingent pricing and abatement decisions, mitigates double marginalization, and can generate joint gains, overturning the conventional incentive to withhold. In the agency model, by contrast, sufficiently asymmetric environmental concerns can make sharing privately unattractive. When the manufacturer is substantially more environmentally concerned, access to the signal may induce higher prices that suppress demand and reduce the platform’s commission revenue. Across both channel structures, information sharing always reduces expected total emissions by better aligning pricing and abatement decisions with realized demand. These results suggest that information-sharing policies should be designed jointly with channel format and ESG alignment, rather than applied uniformly across partners. 

• semanticscholar https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.6316038first seen 2026-05-15 17:29:50