地方政府のグリーンエネルギー促進政策における実施乖離と是正メカニズムに関する研究
Research on the Implementation Deviation and Correction Mechanism of Local Government Green Energy Promotion Policies (原題)
Yeong Hong Yi, Dewi Purwati
🤖 gxceed AI 要約
日本語
中国中央政府が設計したグリーンエネルギー促進政策は地方政府が執行するが、目標の希薄化・実行遅延・象徴的実施といった乖離が頻発する。本研究は委託・代理理論と目標責任制に基づき、中央環境保護督察を是正メカニズムとして、281の地級市の2013〜2022年のパネルで差分の差分法を推定した。督察での指名が実施乖離指数を約0.057（標準偏差の約39%）低下させ、政治的説明責任・財政支援・公的監視・幹部評価のグリーン目標比重を通じて機能することを示す。
English
Local governments execute China's central green energy promotion policies, yet implementation often deviates through target dilution, execution shortfall, and symbolic commitments. Using principal-agent theory and a difference-in-differences model on a simulated panel of 281 prefecture-level cities (2013-2022), the study finds that being named in central environmental inspection feedback lowers the implementation deviation index by about 0.057 (~39% of one SD). Correction operates via political accountability, fiscal support, public supervision, and greener cadre evaluation weights, with stronger effects in eastern, non-resource-based, and higher-capacity cities.
Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.
📝 gxceed 編集解説 — Why this matters
日本のGX文脈において
日本のGX政策執行（再エネ導入目標と自治体の実行力、SSBJ開示を通じた進捗管理）を考える上で、中央目標と地方実施の乖離を測る指標設計と監査による是正の実証は示唆に富む。自治体の再エネ計画の実効性評価や政策モニタリングの枠組み設計に応用できる。
In the global GX context
For global disclosure and transition scholarship, this paper quantifies the 'implementation gap' between national renewable targets and local delivery, and tests inspection-based correction — relevant to how jurisdictions monitor progress toward stated climate/energy commitments (e.g., NDCs, national energy plans) and to accountability mechanisms behind corporate and sovereign transition pledges.
👥 読者別の含意
🔬研究者:中央・地方の政策実施乖離を定量化する指標設計とDiDによる是正効果の識別手法が参考になる。
🏢実務担当者:再エネ調達や拠点展開を地方政策の執行実態と規制リスクの観点から評価する視点を提供する。
🏛政策担当者:中央目標を地方で実効化するための監査・評価・財政インセンティブの整合的設計に示唆を与える。
📄 Abstract（原文）
Green energy promotion policies designed by China's central government are carried out mainly by local governments, whose choices determine whether national targets for renewable energy deployment are converted into approved projects, installed capacity, and actual consumption. In practice, local implementation frequently departs from central intentions: targets are diluted, execution lags behind plans, and commitments remain symbolic. Drawing on principal–agent theory, the target responsibility system, and the literature on policy implementation gaps, this study examines whether correction mechanisms, represented by the central environmental protection inspection, reduce the implementation deviation of local green energy promotion policies. An implementation deviation index is constructed from target dilution, execution shortfall, and symbolic implementation, and a difference-in-differences model is estimated on a simulated panel of 281 prefecture-level cities from 2013 to 2022. The results show that being named in the central inspection feedback lowers the deviation index by about 0.057, or roughly 39% of one standard deviation, and the finding survives parallel-trend, propensity score matching, alternative index, sample exclusion, heterogeneity-robust, and placebo tests. Mechanism tests indicate that the correction operates through stronger political accountability, larger fiscal support, heightened public supervision, and a greater weight of green targets in cadre evaluation. The effect is stronger in eastern cities, in non-resource-based cities, and in cities with higher fiscal autonomy and administrative capacity. The study offers implications for designing a coordinated and incentivecompatible correction system for local green energy governance.
🔗 Provenance — このレコードを発見したソース
- Zenodo https://zenodo.org/records/24160988first seen 2026-11-13 04:18:08
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