Cap-and-trade frameworks for reducing fossil fuel emissions: insight from Australia’s safeguard mechanism and its impact on the coal sector
化石燃料排出削減のためのキャップ・アンド・トレード枠組み：オーストラリアのセーフガード制度と石炭セクターへの影響からの洞察 (AI 翻訳)
Tarra L. Brain, S Harris, Bryce F. J. Kelly
🤖 gxceed AI 要約
日本語
オーストラリアのセーフガード制度はキャップ・アンド・トレード方式で排出削減を目指すが、石炭鉱業への経済的インセンティブが不十分であることを実証。露天掘り鉱山では排出基準が上昇する一方、地下鉱山では急減する。高価格シナリオでもオフセット費用は石炭価格変動内に収まり、排出削減貢献率を4.9%から9.2%に引き上げる必要があると結論。
English
This study evaluates Australia's reformed Safeguard Mechanism, a cap-and-trade framework, focusing on the coal mining sector. Ex-ante analysis reveals that most open-pit mines face increasing emission baselines, while underground mines see rapid decreases. Under a high carbon price scenario, offset costs remain within historical coal price fluctuations, indicating weak incentives for emission reduction. The authors recommend raising the Emission Reduction Contribution from 4.9% to 9.2% and setting separate baselines for surface and underground mines.
Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.
📝 gxceed 編集解説 — Why this matters
日本のGX文脈において
日本ではカーボンプライシング（GX-ETS）の設計が進行中であり、オーストラリアのセーフガード制度の実証分析は、排出枠の強度や産業別ベンチマークの重要性を示唆する。特に石炭・高排出産業へのインセンティブ設計の課題は、日本のGX-ETS運用に示唆を与える。
In the global GX context
This paper provides empirical evidence on the effectiveness of cap-and-trade mechanisms in reducing emissions in hard-to-abate sectors. It highlights the risk of weak baselines and insufficient carbon prices, offering lessons for global carbon pricing frameworks such as the EU ETS and emerging mechanisms. The analysis of offset costs relative to commodity price volatility is relevant for designing robust carbon markets.
👥 読者別の含意
🔬研究者:Provides a rigorous ex-ante assessment of a national cap-and-trade policy, with implications for carbon pricing design and sectoral baseline setting.
🏢実務担当者:Highlights the importance of understanding policy incentives when planning emission reduction investments in coal or other high-emitting sectors.
🏛政策担当者:Offers evidence on the need for stringent baselines and higher emission reduction contributions to ensure policy effectiveness.
📄 Abstract（原文）
<b>Background:</b> Under Australia's National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Scheme, the reformed Safeguard Mechanism employs a cap-and-trade framework to meet domestic emission reduction targets and international obligations under the Paris Agreement. It remains unclear whether the reformed policy provides sufficient incentives to drive emissions reductions, particularly in the coal mining sector. This is critical given Australia's targets of 43% below 2005 levels by 2030 and net-zero emissions by 2050. <b>Methods:</b> Using operator reported emission intensity data, we calculate the applied emission intensity used in setting facility emission caps (baselines) under the policy, to observe trends in future emission caps across mine types and locations. To evaluate the strength of economic incentives under the policy, we establish a high price carbon offset scenario, under the Australian Government's cost containment measure, to compare the maximum unit cost of offsetting for each mine facility. This is assessed within the context of historical fluctuations in the coal commodity price. <b>Results:</b> Through ex-ante analysis, we found that most open-pit coal mines will experience an increasing emission baseline over the policy lifetime, while most high-emitting underground mines will experience a rapidly decreasing baseline. Under the high price scenario, the unit offset cost across all mines is within the bounds of historical fluctuation in the monthly commodity price of Australian coal between 2019 and 2024. With respect to coal, to achieve the aims of the Safeguard Mechanism, this analysis indicated that the emission reduction contribution (ERC) would need to increase from 4.9% to 9.2%. <b>Conclusion:</b> Economic incentives within the policy do not provide adequate material incentive for coal mine operators to invest in emission reduction strategies. The policy imposes a weak and non-binding emission cap, particularly for the coal mining sector, which may impede its efficacy as an emission reduction policy. Reform to the Safeguard Mechanism is required to incentivise industry emission reduction in the Australian coal sector. The Safeguard Mechanism does not provide strong economic incentive for operators of open-pit coal mining facilities to invest in on-site emission reduction.To strengthen the Safeguard Mechanism, separate industry average emission intensities are required for surface and underground coal mines.The effectiveness of the Safeguard Mechanism may be enhanced by increasing the policy wide Emission Reduction Contribution from 4.9% to 9.2%. The Safeguard Mechanism does not provide strong economic incentive for operators of open-pit coal mining facilities to invest in on-site emission reduction. To strengthen the Safeguard Mechanism, separate industry average emission intensities are required for surface and underground coal mines. The effectiveness of the Safeguard Mechanism may be enhanced by increasing the policy wide Emission Reduction Contribution from 4.9% to 9.2%.
🔗 Provenance — このレコードを発見したソース
- openalex https://figshare.com/articles/journal_contribution/Cap-and-trade_frameworks_for_reducing_fossil_fuel_emissions_insight_from_Australia_s_safeguard_mechanism_and_its_impact_on_the_coal_sector/32685964first seen 2026-07-06 04:39:20 · last seen 2026-07-07 04:36:53
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