ハイブリッドゲーム理論メカニズムを考慮したマルチパーク統合エネルギーシステムの低炭素最適化スケジューリング
Low-carbon optimization scheduling of multi-park integrated energy systems considering hybrid game theory mechanisms (原題)
Xiu Ji, Meng Li, Yiqi Liu, Haolin Li, Huan Cheng
🤖 gxceed AI 要約
日本語
「双炭」政策下で、グリーン証書と炭素取引メカニズムを組み込んだ多拠点統合エネルギーシステムの低炭素経済ディスパッチモデルを提案。上位に系統運用者、下位にパーク連合を置く二層ハイブリッドゲームを構築し、ナッシュ交渉を協調コスト最小化と収益最大化の二つの部分問題に変換、ADMMで求解する。結果、多様な負荷需要を満たしつつ収益増とウィンウィンを実現できることを示した。
English
This paper proposes a low-carbon economic dispatch model for multi-park integrated energy systems that integrates a green-certificate and carbon-trading mechanism with hybrid game theory. A two-layer leader-follower game (system operator vs. park alliance) plus Nash bargaining for electricity-heat sharing is solved via ADMM. Results show higher revenue and a win-win outcome while meeting diverse load demands.
Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.
📝 gxceed 編集解説 — Why this matters
日本のGX文脈において
中国のグリーン証書・炭素市場と電力市場を前提とした運用最適化であり、日本ではSSBJ開示やScope2算定の裏側にある電力調達・炭素価格設計を検討する際の参考事例となる。特に複数拠点を持つ企業の再エネ調達と炭素コスト最適化の設計に示唆を与える。
In the global GX context
Adds to the global literature on carbon-pricing and green-certificate mechanisms embedded in energy-system operations, complementing TCFD/ISSB internal carbon pricing and transition-planning work. It illustrates how market-based instruments can be co-optimized with physical dispatch, relevant to CSRD/ISSB-aligned transition finance discussions.
👥 読者別の含意
🔬研究者:ゲーム理論と炭素・グリーン証書市場を組み合わせた多主体エネルギー最適化の定式化とADMM求解手法が参考になる。
🏢実務担当者:複数拠点の再エネ調達・炭素コストを統合最適化する際のモデル設計と、内部炭素価格・グリーン証書活用の考え方を示唆。
🏛政策担当者:グリーン証書と炭素取引を組み合わせた市場メカニズム設計が、低炭素ディスパッチと両立し得る点を政策検討の参考にできる。
📄 Abstract(原文)
Under the “dual carbon” background, to promote the low-carbon energy transition, a low-carbon economic dispatch model for multi-park integrated energy system considering a green certificate-carbon trading mechanism and hybrid game theory is proposed. First, a two-layer hybrid game model is constructed. The upper-layer model treats the system operator as the leader, aiming to maximize its own revenue by formulating energy purchase and sale pricing strategies. The lower-layer model treats the multi-park integrated energy system alliance as the follower, aiming to optimize its own output to achieve the overall economic optimization of the alliance. Second, a green certificate-carbon trading mechanism is introduced into the hybrid game of the multi-park integrated energy system to improve the overall low-carbon economic efficiency of the system. Finally, based on Nash game theory, a two-layer hybrid game optimization model is constructed, incorporating a dynamic multi-energy pricing mechanism with a master-follower game and a cooperative game of electricity-heat sharing among Park Integrated Energy System (Power, Energy, and Environment) systems. The Nash bargaining problem is then transformed into two sub-problems: minimizing the cooperative cost and maximizing the cooperative revenue of the multi-park integrated energy system. The alternating direction multiplier method is used for solving these sub-problems. Results show that this method can enable the system to obtain more revenue and achieve a win-win situation while meeting the diverse load demands of the system.
🔗 Provenance — このレコードを発見したソース
- openalex https://doi.org/10.3389/fenrg.2026.1906766first seen 2026-09-17 04:50:31
- primary_source https://doi.org/10.3389/fenrg.2026.1906766first seen 2026-09-21 00:06:07
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