グリーン移行における政策シナジー：命令、市場、自主的介入による汚染・炭素削減の三者進化ゲーム分析
Policy synergy in green transition: a tripartite evolutionary game analysis of pollution and carbon mitigation through command, market, and voluntary interventions (原題)
Yucheng Zhu, Ke Wang
🤖 gxceed AI 要約
日本語
中国政府・企業・消費者の三者進化ゲームモデルを構築し、命令・市場・自主的介入の政策ミックスがグリーン生産と消費に与える影響を分析。初期の規制強化と教育が重要で、産業特性に応じた政策選択（排出削減余地の大きい産業は炭素市場、小さい産業は環境税）が効果的。市場メカニズムは効率性を高めるが、消費側の自主的介入は代替不可と結論。
English
This study develops a tripartite evolutionary game model of government, enterprises, and consumers to analyze how command-control, market-incentive, and voluntary policies jointly promote green production and consumption. Findings show that initial regulatory intensity and education are crucial, and policy design should be tailored to industry heterogeneity: carbon markets suit high-abatement sectors, while environmental taxes suit low-abatement ones. Market tools can lower compliance costs when carbon prices are high, but voluntary consumption-side interventions remain indispensable.
Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.
📝 gxceed 編集解説 — Why this matters
日本のGX文脈において
日本のGX政策（GX推進法、カーボンプライシング、省エネ法）において、政策ミックスの設計と産業特性に応じた制度選択の重要性を示す示唆に富む。特に、排出削減余地の大きい産業への市場メカニズム適用と、中小企業への行政的規制の併用は、日本の産業構造にも応用可能。
In the global GX context
This paper contributes to global GX policy scholarship by modeling the interplay of regulatory, market, and voluntary instruments in achieving pollution-carbon synergy. Its insights on policy sequencing and industry-specific instrument choice are relevant for jurisdictions implementing carbon pricing and complementary regulations, such as the EU's ETS and CBAM, and for aligning with ISSB disclosure expectations.
👥 読者別の含意
🔬研究者:Provides a formal game-theoretic framework for analyzing policy mixes in green transition, useful for extending to other contexts.
🏢実務担当者:Highlights the importance of anticipating regulatory and market policy shifts when planning decarbonization investments.
🏛政策担当者:Offers evidence on how to sequence and tailor policy instruments to industry characteristics for effective pollution and carbon reduction.
📄 Abstract（原文）
Promoting the synergy of pollution reduction and carbon mitigation is a crucial strategy for China’s current climate and environmental governance. This requires active policy measures from both the production and consumption sides. This study constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model of the government, enterprises, and consumers, while considering the effects of green transformation on pollution reduction and carbon mitigation. It explores the impact of the coordinated implementation of command-control, market-incentive, and voluntary policies on promoting green production and consumption. The key findings are as follows: 1) The decisions of the government, enterprises, and consumers are interrelated. To drive the system toward the optimal equilibrium state of green production and consumption, breaking the initial path dependence is crucial. The government must enhance regulatory intensity in the early stages and strengthen publicity and education for enterprises and the public, thereby effectively elevating the initial participation willingness of all three parties. 2) Policy implementation should be tailored to industrial heterogeneity. For industries with substantial abatement potential and high emission intensity, market policies are most effective; these sectors should be prioritized for inclusion in the carbon trading market with differentiated quota schemes. Conversely, for industries with lower emission bases and limited abatement potential, low-cost administrative controls or direct environmental taxes are more suitable. 3) The substitution relationship among policies requires dynamic alignment with market and technological maturity, yet a diversified policy mix remains indispensable. When abatement efficiency and carbon prices are sufficiently high, market-based tools can lower compliance costs through streamlined processes, such as replacing environmental taxes with a single carbon trading mechanism. However, voluntary interventions on the consumption side cannot be substituted by market regulation or mandatory supervision.
🔗 Provenance — このレコードを発見したソース
- openalex https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-026-08891-5first seen 2026-09-04 05:04:06
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