Emission-reduction cooperation among technologically complementary manufacturers under a carbon cap-and-trade mechanism with price competition
排出量取引制度と価格競争の下での技術補完的な製造業者間の排出削減協力 (AI 翻訳)
Mingke He, Yi Zhou, Yihan Qiao, Yi Ding, X. Gui
🤖 gxceed AI 要約
日本語
本研究は、キャップ・アンド・トレード制度下で価格競争する技術補完的製造業者の排出削減協力を非協力・協力バイフォームゲームで分析。結果、高い排出削減投資係数は削減水準と利益を抑制。炭素取引価格の上昇は削減と利益を促進するが、初期割当量の効果は限定的。技術転換能力の向上が削減水準と収益性を改善することが示された。
English
This study uses a biform game model to analyze emission reduction cooperation among technologically complementary manufacturers under a cap-and-trade mechanism with price competition. Results show that high emission reduction investment coefficients hinder abatement levels and profits. Higher carbon trading prices significantly boost emission reductions and profits, while initial allowance allocation has limited effect. Technological conversion capability improvement enhances both abatement and profitability.
Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.
📝 gxceed 編集解説 — Why this matters
日本のGX文脈において
日本では東京都や埼玉県の排出量取引制度があり、全国的なカーボンプライシング導入が検討されている。本論文は、競合企業間の協調的排出削減が価格競争下でどう機能するかを理論的に示し、日本の製造業における協調スキーム設計や初期割当政策に示唆を与える。
In the global GX context
As carbon pricing mechanisms expand globally (e.g., EU ETS, China's national ETS) and firms face pressure to cooperate on decarbonization, this paper provides a game-theoretic framework to understand when and how competing manufacturers collaborate on emission reductions under cap-and-trade with price competition. It offers insights for policy design and corporate strategy.
👥 読者別の含意
🔬研究者:Game-theoretic modeling of cooperative emission reduction under carbon pricing with price competition offers methodological insights for further studies.
🏢実務担当者:Manufacturing firms can use the findings to evaluate collaboration strategies under carbon cap-and-trade, especially the role of technological compatibility and carbon price levels.
🏛政策担当者:The limited effect of initial allowance allocation suggests policy focus should be on carbon price levels and supporting technological conversion capabilities.
📄 Abstract（原文）
In recent years, driven by emission reduction targets, an increasing number of manufacturers producing similar products have been compelled to seek emission reduction cooperation even while competing in the market, a phenomenon that has attracted growing attention in recent studies. Based on the carbon cap-and-trade mechanism, this study develops a noncooperative–cooperative biform game model to examine the optimal decisions of technologically complementary manufacturers engaging in emission reduction cooperation under price competition. The model describes alliance profits using a characteristic function and applies the Shapley value for profit allocation, while equilibrium outcomes are derived through noncooperative game analysis. The research results show that the high carbon emission reduction investment coefficient will inhibit the carbon abatement development level of manufacturers and reduce their profits. Without a carbon cap-and-trade mechanism, competitive manufacturers lack incentives for technological collaboration. An increase in carbon trading prices significantly promotes emission reductions and profit growth, whereas the effect of government-allocated initial carbon allowances remains limited. Moreover, the improvement of manufacturers’ technological conversion capability can improve the level of carbon abatement development and enhance their profitability under price competition. In general, this study provides theoretical and practical guidance for the cooperative emission reduction of competitive enterprises under the carbon emission rights trading mechanism.
🔗 Provenance — このレコードを発見したソース
- semanticscholar https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0345856first seen 2026-05-15 17:23:25
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