Strategic ESG Disclosure When Ratings Reveal Investor Preferences
投資家の選好を明らかにする格付けを考慮した戦略的ESG開示 (AI 翻訳)
Jan Schneemeier, Adelina Barbalau
🤖 gxceed AI 要約
日本語
本論文は、ESG格付けが投資家の非財務的選好を企業に伝えることで、企業のESG開示操作のインセンティブを強化するメカニズムをモデル化する。格付けの精度が高いほど操作意欲は高まるが、同時に操作の価格影響は低下するため、均衡操作量は格付け精度に対して非単調となる。中程度の精度の格付けは、格付けがない場合よりも投資家の厚生を悪化させうる。
English
This paper models a strategic interaction where ESG ratings inform firms about investor preferences, strengthening incentives to manipulate ESG disclosures. Greater rating precision amplifies manipulation motives but reduces its price impact, leading to non-monotone manipulation in precision. Moderately precise ratings can leave investors worse off than no rating at all.
Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.
📝 gxceed 編集解説 — Why this matters
日本のGX文脈において
日本ではSSBJ基準や有価証券報告書でのESG開示が進む中、格付け精度の設計が企業の開示行動や投資家保護に与える影響を示唆する。格付けの社会的価値が単純に精度に比例しない点は、国内の格付け制度設計において重要な視点を提供する。
In the global GX context
In global contexts like ISSB and SEC climate disclosure rules, this paper highlights that ESG ratings can inadvertently increase disclosure manipulation. Regulators and standard-setters should consider rating precision as a double-edged sword—improving information may worsen manipulation if not carefully calibrated.
👥 読者別の含意
🔬研究者:Provides a formal model of ESG disclosure manipulation as a function of rating precision, useful for future empirical and theoretical work.
🏢実務担当者:Warns that higher ESG rating precision may increase manipulation incentives; companies and investors should be aware of potential biases.
🏛政策担当者:Suggests that moderately precise ratings can harm investor welfare; policymakers should consider regulation of rating methodologies to mitigate unintended consequences.
📄 Abstract（原文）
<div> We develop a model in which an ESG rating informs investors about firms' ESG profiles and, simultaneously, informs firms about investors’ non-financial preferences. A firm that receives an unfavorable rating infers that its ESG profile is misaligned with investor preferences, strengthening its incentive to manipulate ESG-related disclosures. Greater rating precision amplifies this incentive by giving the firm a clearer read on what investors want, but also reduces the price impact of manipulation by leaving less room for disclosure to shift investors' beliefs. Equilibrium manipulation can therefore be non-monotone in rating precision and can exceed the level that would prevail in the absence of a rating. Consequently, a moderately precise rating can leave investors worse off than no rating at all. </div> <div> <br> </div>
🔗 Provenance — このレコードを発見したソース
- openaire https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.6643178first seen 2026-07-18 05:07:50
🔔 こうした論文の新着を逃したくない方は キーワードアラート に登録（無料・3キーワードまで）。
gxceed は公開メタデータに基づく研究支援データセットです。要約・翻訳・解説は AI 支援で生成されています。 最終的な解釈・検証は利用者が原典資料に基づいて行うことを前提とします。