サステナビリティ報告が取締役のESG義務に与える影響：開示・義務フィードバックループ
The Impact of Sustainability Reporting on Directors' ESG Duties: The Disclosure-Duty Feedback Loop (原題)
Luh Luh Lan
🤖 gxceed AI 要約
日本語
本論文は、サステナビリティ報告の成熟が取締役のESG義務の曖昧さを解消せず拡大させた逆説を「開示・義務フィードバックループ」概念で説明する。会社法が結果ではなくプロセスを規律するため、強制開示は取締役会に信頼性ある開示を生む体制構築を要求し、各報告書がその後の取締役行為を評価する基準となることで義務が段階的に強化される。ISSB基準（英・シンガポール）、EU（二重重要性維持）、米国（連邦撤退・カリフォルニア域外適用）の3制度を比較し、監督義務の明確化、Scope 3等のセーフハーバー、比例的な保証、相互承認の4改革を提言する。
English
This paper explains why maturing sustainability reporting has expanded rather than resolved ambiguity over directors' ESG duties, via a 'disclosure-duty feedback loop'. Because company law regulates process not outcomes, mandatory reporting pulls boards into governing the underlying subject matter, and each report becomes a benchmark ratcheting duties upward. Comparing ISSB (UK/Singapore), EU (double materiality post-Omnibus I), and US (federal withdrawal, California extraterritorial) regimes, it proposes four reforms: clearer oversight duties, safe harbours for forward-looking and Scope 3 disclosure, proportionate assurance, and mutual recognition.
Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.
📝 gxceed 編集解説 — Why this matters
日本のGX文脈において
SSBJ基準の導入と有報・統合報告書での保証義務拡大を控える日本にとって、開示が取締役の善管注意義務・監督責任にどう波及するかは取締役会・監査役設置会社の実務に直結する。英国・シンガポール型のプロセス規律アプローチは、日本型コーポレートガバナンス改革の次の論点を先取りしている。
In the global GX context
As ISSB-aligned standards (SSBJ, UK, Singapore) and CSRD/California rules diverge, this paper maps how mandatory disclosure converts into enforceable board duties — directly relevant to ISSB adoption debates, assurance policy, and the safe-harbour question for Scope 3 and forward-looking statements in the US and EU.
👥 読者別の含意
🔬研究者:開示規制と会社法上の取締役義務の相互作用を法域比較で捉える理論枠組みを提供する。
🏢実務担当者:取締役会・サステナビリティ部門は、開示体制構築が監督責任として問われる前提で内部統制と保証対応を設計すべき。
🏛政策担当者:開示義務の強化が既存の取締役義務を通じて執行される点を踏まえ、セーフハーバーと比例的な保証制度の設計が急務。
📄 Abstract（原文）
Maturation of sustainability reporting has expanded, rather than resolved, the ambiguity surrounding directors’ ESG duties. Reporting standards specify what must be disclosed, but not what directors must do behind the disclosure, while regulatory regimes diverge in scope, materiality and enforcement. The paper explains this paradox through a “disclosure-duty feedback loop”. Because company law regulates process rather than outcomes, mandatory reporting requires boards to establish and oversee systems capable of producing reliable disclosures, drawing them into the governance of the underlying subject matter. Each report then becomes a benchmark against which subsequent board conduct may be assessed, causing the obligation to ratchet upward as disclosure becomes mandatory and assured. The paper traces this loop across three regimes: an ISSB baseline adopted in Singapore and the United Kingdom; an EU regime narrowed by Omnibus I but retaining a commitment to double materiality; and a US regime withdrawn at the federal level, while California extends reporting obligations extraterritorially. It shows that the loop operates through existing duties, with three channels in the United Kingdom, two in Singapore and effectively one in Delaware. The loop therefore inherits the limits of those duties in standard, foreseeability and enforcement, and is strained where listing and incorporation jurisdictions diverge. It strengthens monitoring without making directors guarantors of ESG outcomes. The paper proposes four reforms: clearer oversight duties, safe harbours for good-faith forward-looking and Scope 3 disclosures, proportionate assurance, and mutual recognition for dual reporters.
🔗 Provenance — このレコードを発見したソース
- openalex https://doi.org/10.67929/ecgi-law-970-2026first seen 2026-10-14 05:00:55
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