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銀行のESGグリーンウォッシングはいつ金融安定性を脅かすのか？モンテカルロ・シミュレーション

When Does Bank ESG Greenwashing Threaten Financial Stability? A Monte Carlo Simulation (原題)

Muhammad Mohsin

Crossrefプレプリント2026-01-01#グリーンウォッシュ経営インパクト: 資金調達対象セクター: finance
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.7096723
原典: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.7096723

🤖 gxceed AI 要約

日本語

本研究は、銀行のESG開示と実態の乖離（グリーンウォッシング）が金融安定性に与える影響を、モンテカルロ・シミュレーションを用いて分析する。市場規律と監督の強度に応じて、グリーンウォッシングが私的に有益となる条件と、システムリスクに波及するメカニズムを解明。強制保証、 financed emissions 報告、システムリスク追加賦課などの政策がテール損失を削減することを示す。

English

This study uses Monte Carlo simulation to analyze how bank ESG greenwashing (disclosure-performance gaps) affects financial stability. It finds that greenwashing can be privately attractive under weak supervision but becomes costly with scrutiny and contagion. Mandatory assurance, granular financed-emissions reporting, and systemic-risk add-ons reduce tail losses.

Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.

📝 gxceed 編集解説 — Why this matters

日本のGX文脈において

日本ではSSBJ開示が始まり、金融庁もESG開示の信頼性向上を重視している。本論文は、グリーンウォッシングが金融システムリスクに発展する経路を示し、日本の監督当局や銀行経営陣が開示の質を確保する根拠を提供する。

In the global GX context

Globally, with ISSB and CSRD raising disclosure standards, this paper provides a model-based rationale for regulators to enforce ESG assurance and monitor systemic risks from greenwashing, complementing existing empirical studies.

👥 読者別の含意

🔬研究者:Provides a novel simulation framework linking greenwashing to systemic risk, useful for further empirical testing.

🏢実務担当者:Highlights the financial stability risks of ESG misrepresentation, informing bank boards and sustainability teams on disclosure integrity.

🏛政策担当者:Offers evidence for mandatory ESG assurance and systemic-risk add-ons for banks with high disclosure gaps.

📄 Abstract（原文）

This study develops a non-survey, non-SEM and non-panel-data research design to examine whether banks' ESG misrepresentations can ever be worthwhile once market discipline and financial-stability externalities are considered. Building on research on greenwashing, ESG rating disagreement, climate-related financial risk, systemic risk and financial networks, the paper proposes a market-discipline simulation in which a bank's sustainability disclosure can diverge from its underlying ESG performance. The disclosure-performance gap increases discovery probability, investor repricing, reputational penalty and network spillovers. A synthetic banking system is calibrated using stylized findings from the banking, sustainable finance and systemic-risk literatures and evaluated through 12,000 Monte Carlo event replications across four market-supervisory regimes. Results show that greenwashing can appear privately attractive under low attention and weak supervision, but the expected payoff becomes negative once scrutiny, credible penalties and contagion channels are included. Very high disclosure-performance gaps generate nonlinear increases in expected shortfall, and the systemic effect is strongest for large, opaque and highly connected banks. Counterfactual analysis indicates that mandatory ESG assurance, granular financed-emissions reporting and systemic-risk add-ons for high-gap central banks materially reduce tail losses. The study contributes by treating greenwashing as an information-based systemic-risk mechanism rather than only a reputational or ethical problem. It offers a rigorous model-based framework for supervisors, investors and bank boards to evaluate sustainability misrepresentation as a threat to market integrity and financial stability.

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