Institutional Investor Network Centrality and Corporate ESG Rating Divergence: Evidence From China
機関投資家ネットワーク中心性と企業のESG格付けの乖離：中国からのエビデンス (AI 翻訳)
Wennanxiang Wang, Minna Yu, Luqing Shi, D. Jiang
🤖 gxceed AI 要約
日本語
本研究は、機関投資家のネットワーク中心性が企業のESG格付けの乖離に与える影響を中国企業データで分析。高い中心性を持つ機関投資家は、ESG情報開示意欲の向上、開示の標準化、戦略的開示の抑制を通じて乖離を緩和する。ISO非取得企業や非国有企業、監視が弱い企業で効果が顕著。
English
This study examines the impact of institutional investor network centrality on ESG rating divergence using Chinese firm data. Higher centrality mitigates divergence by improving disclosure willingness, standardizing disclosure, and reducing strategic disclosure. The effect is stronger for firms without ISO certification, non-state-owned firms, and those with weak scrutiny.
Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.
📝 gxceed 編集解説 — Why this matters
日本のGX文脈において
本稿は、日本の機関投資家が投資先企業のESG情報開示の質を高める上で、ネットワークガバナンスが有効であることを示唆する。特に、規制が弱い環境や情報の断片化が進む日本市場で応用可能性がある。
In the global GX context
This paper highlights the role of institutional investor networks as a governance mechanism to reduce ESG rating divergence, relevant for global markets with fragmented information environments. It complements formal regulatory approaches like ISSB and CSRD.
👥 読者別の含意
🔬研究者:Demonstrates how network centrality of institutional investors can reduce ESG rating divergence through disclosure channels.
🏢実務担当者:Institutional investors can leverage their network positions to improve portfolio firms' ESG disclosure quality.
🏛政策担当者:Suggests policy support for institutional investor network governance as a complement to formal regulation in weak oversight settings.
📄 Abstract（原文）
Environmental, social and governance (ESG) rating divergence undermines the informational efficiency of capital markets and amplifies systemic vulnerability. To address this concern, we investigate the effect of institutional investor network centrality on firms' ESG rating divergence. Empirical results reveal that institutional investors with higher network centrality can mitigate corporate ESG rating divergence. Mechanism analysis identifies three channels through which this effect operates: improving corporate willingness to disclose ESG information, promoting standardised ESG information disclosure and decreasing strategic ESG disclosure. Heterogeneity tests indicate that the mitigating effect is especially pronounced for firms without ISO certification, non‐state‐owned firms, and those facing limited public scrutiny or weak governmental environmental regulation. Further analysis suggests that institutional investors' governance incentives arise from concerns about potential losses associated with stock price crash risk and liquidity risk. Overall, our results highlight institutional investor network governance as an additional governance channel, particularly salient in settings with weak formal oversight and a fragmented information environment.
🔗 Provenance — このレコードを発見したソース
- semanticscholar https://doi.org/10.1111/acfi.70177first seen 2026-07-18 07:31:57
🔔 こうした論文の新着を逃したくない方は キーワードアラート に登録（無料・3キーワードまで）。
gxceed は公開メタデータに基づく研究支援データセットです。要約・翻訳・解説は AI 支援で生成されています。 最終的な解釈・検証は利用者が原典資料に基づいて行うことを前提とします。