転換ゲーム：企業脱炭素化における現金保持と現金抽出
The Conversion Game: Cash Retention versus Cash Extraction in Corporate Decarbonization (原題)
Boutron-Löchen, Philippe
🤖 gxceed AI 要約
日本語
炭素課税が財務制約下の排出企業から現金を奪うのに対し、脱炭素目標未達時に株主配当を社内に留保する新たな制裁メカニズム（Decarbonized Dividend Share）を提案。株式転換は自発的で不可逆的であり、配当を割引新株で支払うことで現金を社内に留め、削減投資に充当する。理論モデルにより、抽出制裁の3領域（1期間遵守、無期限遅延、座礁）を特定し、留保が全領域で資金調達を可能にすることを示す。
English
This paper proposes a novel sanction mechanism—Decarbonized Dividend Shares (DDS)—that retains shareholder distributions inside the firm when decarbonization targets are missed, contrasting with carbon charges that extract cash. Conversion is voluntary, individual, and irreversible, with dividends paid in discounted new shares, keeping cash for abatement investment. The model identifies three regions of extraction sanctions (one-period compliance, unbounded delay, stranding) and shows retention funds abatement in all three. The mechanism is sabotage-proof with an explicit scrip discount interval and complements carbon pricing where charges would strand firms.
Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.
📝 gxceed 編集解説 — Why this matters
日本のGX文脈において
日本のGX実践において、SSBJ開示や移行計画が求められる中、本稿のDDSは株主還元と脱炭素投資を結ぶ新たなコーポレートガバナンス手段を示唆。炭素価格が導入されていない日本では、価格に依存しない条件付き留保制約として参考になる。
In the global GX context
Globally, this paper contributes to transition finance scholarship by offering a mechanism that does not rely on a traded carbon price, complementing carbon pricing and quantity systems. It provides a novel design for aligning shareholder distributions with decarbonization targets, relevant to ISSB/CSRD disclosure and transition plan frameworks.
👥 読者別の含意
🔬研究者:Theoretical contribution to transition finance and corporate governance mechanisms for decarbonization.
🏢実務担当者:Potential tool for firms to finance abatement without external carbon pricing, though practical implementation requires legal and governance adjustments.
🏛政策担当者:Consider as a complement to carbon pricing, especially in jurisdictions without a carbon price, to incentivize decarbonization without stranding firms.
📄 Abstract（原文）
The Conversion Game: Cash Retention versus Cash Extraction in Corporate Decarbonization Working paper, draft v9.1 — September 2026 Carbon charges remove cash from firms just when financially constrained emitters need it to invest in transformation. This paper studies the alternative incidence: a sanction that retains shareholder distributions inside the firm when a decarbonization target is missed. The implementing security is a Decarbonized Dividend Share (DDS): an ordinary share whose dividend, off an audited trajectory, is paid in discounted new shares of the same class. The cash stays in the firm and is credited to abatement. Conversion from ordinary shares is voluntary, individual, and irreversible. The legal building blocks exist in company law; the combination is new. Results Incidence. The per-share wealth gap between the two classes is dδ/(1−δ), independent of the adoption rate. Conversion is therefore a dominance decision, not a coordination game. The share register aggregates dispersed information about compliance. Financing. Under standard financing frictions, an extraction sanction has three regions: one-period compliance below a closed-form threshold; unbounded delay between that threshold and current profit; stranding above both. Retention funds abatement in all three. Design. An explicit interval for the scrip discount makes the mechanism sabotage-proof: no controlling coalition prefers to miss. As adoption completes, the price component of the instrument extinguishes. What remains is a conditional-retention constraint that does not require a traded carbon price. Scope The clause mobilises distribution-paying firms. It produces no public revenue. It consumes a credible trajectory; it does not produce one. It is a complement where a charge would strand the firm, and a candidate constraint at the end of a quantity system — not a substitute for a carbon price where the charge is feasible. Full proofs are in Appendix A. Simulations in Section 7 are Monte-Carlo estimates over 1,000 draws. Related work Boutron-Löchen (2025). Original specification of the instrument. Boutron-Löchen (2026). Normative foundation. Licence CC-BY-4.0. Working paper. Not peer-reviewed. JEL: D62, G32, G35, Q54, Q58
🔗 Provenance — このレコードを発見したソース
- Zenodo https://zenodo.org/records/22235427first seen 2026-09-02 04:24:25 · last seen 2026-09-15 04:12:37
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