サステナブルバンキング：資金調達コスト、利益管理、ESGウォッシング

Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.

🔬研究者:Provides robust empirical evidence on the link between ESG engagement, funding costs, and earnings management in banking.

🏢実務担当者:Highlights the financial benefits of environmental engagement and the importance of managerial ability in credible ESG reporting.

🏛政策担当者:Suggests that regulatory oversight should consider ESG controversies and managerial competence to curb opportunistic reporting.

This thesis comprises three empirical studies that examine the role of sustainability-related choices and managerial competence in shaping banks’ financial behaviour and reporting quality. Each study is self-contained to allow independent reading and collectively they explore how environmental engagement, environmental, social, and governance (ESG) controversies, and managerial ability affect banks’ funding costs, earnings management, and ESG washing (or ESG greenwashing) behaviour using international samples and robust econometric methods (e.g., fixed effects, instrumental variables, Oster test, and propensity score matching). The first study investigates whether banks’ environmental engagement influences funding costs. Using a global sample and multiple distinct funding-cost measures, I show that banks with stronger environmental engagement consistently experience lower funding costs across a range of specifications. This advantage is particularly pronounced for banks operating in advanced, less‑concentrated banking systems, in countries with stronger currencies, and among banks with lower deposit dependence. The evidence is consistent with the Paris Agreement having raised awareness among depositors and investors about their role in mitigating climate change. Although favourable investor and depositor responses are generally driven by sound risk management, capital adequacy, and asset size, periods of rising real interest rates and economic crises shift priorities toward higher financial returns. This study contributes to the literature by clarifying previously mixed evidence and by providing evidence consistent with environmental engagement being associated with reductions in banks’ cost of funding. The second study examines how banks respond to ESG controversies through earnings management. Drawing on a global panel covering two decades, I find a positive relationship between ESG controversies and income-increasing earnings management. This behaviour is stronger among large, publicly listed banks, banks facing higher capital risk, banks in lower-GDP countries, and banks in countries without mandatory International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) adoption. Managers often react to these controversies within the same period by inflating reported profitability. This pattern is evident during social or governance controversies, but not during environmental controversies. The evidence is most consistent with agency-motivated responses, suggesting that managers may adjust accounting outcomes in ways that protect compensation, reputations, and job security, although the evidence does not directly identify managerial intent. This study extends the literature by linking ESG controversies to opportunistic financial reporting in the banking sector and by identifying institutional and bank-level conditions that amplify this behaviour. The third study evaluates whether managerial ability mitigates banks’ ESG washing behaviour. Using an international sample, I show that banks led by higher-ability managers are significantly less prone to opportunistic ESG disclosure. The mitigating effect of managerial ability is stronger for public, high-reputation, and highly liquid banks and in countries with higher Human Development Index (HDI). Consistent with upper-echelons and signalling theories, capable managers constrain opportunistic disclosure particularly under integrated reporting regimes, following profit warnings, and when controversies involve accounting or executive compensation. However, the restraining influence of managerial ability weakens when executive pay is elevated or closely tied to performance incentives. I also document heterogeneity across ESG dimensions, with managerial ability having the largest effect in reducing greenwashing, a moderate effect on governance washing, and a smaller effect on social washing. This study contributes to understanding the governance roots of disclosure quality and highlights managerial competence as a key determinant of ESG reporting credibility. Together, the three studies offer actionable insights for regulators, bank managers, auditors, investors, and other market participants. First, findings on funding-cost benefits of environmental engagement are consistent with the view that banks may benefit from integrating sustainability into strategic decision-making and support policy efforts that raise stakeholder awareness of environmental performance. Second, evidence that ESG controversies trigger opportunistic earnings management calls for closer regulatory and supervisory scrutiny, stronger disclosure and accounting oversight, and more vigilant auditing practices. Third, the demonstrated role of managerial ability in limiting ESG washing suggests that investors and supervisors should incorporate managerial-skill assessments into their evaluations and that policies aimed at capability-building and better executive incentives may improve ESG disclosure quality. Collectively, the thesis advances academic knowledge on sustainability in banking and provides practical guidance to strengthen financial stability, market discipline, and corporate accountability in an era of rising stakeholder attention to ESG issues.

• openaire https://doi.org/10.7488/era/7532first seen 2026-09-01 05:01:14 · last seen 2026-09-21 04:33:03