Evolutionary game analysis of transition finance for coal enterprises under dual-carbon goals: a four-party perspective
双炭目標下における石炭企業の移行ファイナンスの進化ゲーム分析：四者間の視点 (AI 翻訳)
Tian Qiu, Liangmou Gao
🤖 gxceed AI 要約
日本語
本論文は、中国の石炭産業における大手国有企業、中小民間企業、地方政府、金融機関の四者間の戦略的相互作用を進化ゲーム理論で分析。差別化された補助金、炭素税、政府の信用維持が協調的移行に必要と示唆している。
English
This paper develops a four-party evolutionary game model analyzing strategic interactions among large state-owned coal enterprises, SMEs, local governments, and financial institutions in China's coal industry transition. It finds that a policy portfolio of differentiated subsidies, carbon taxes, financial incentives, and government credibility is essential for coordinated transition.
Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.
📝 gxceed 編集解説 — Why this matters
日本のGX文脈において
日本でも石炭火力のフェードアウトと移行ファイナンスが議論されており、本論文の分析枠組みは政策と金融機関の役割分担を示唆する。特に、補助金と炭素税の組み合わせや政府の段階的関与は、日本の電力部門改革にも応用可能。
In the global GX context
This paper contributes to global transition finance scholarship by modeling multi-stakeholder dynamics in hard-to-abate sectors. The policy portfolio approach and the identification of phased government roles are directly relevant for coal-dependent economies worldwide.
👥 読者別の含意
🔬研究者:Provides an evolutionary game framework for analyzing transition finance policy design in extractive industries.
🏢実務担当者:Offers insights for corporate strategy in coal companies navigating transition finance subsidies and carbon pricing.
🏛政策担当者:Highlights the need for differentiated subsidies, carbon taxes, and phased government intervention in transition finance.
📄 Abstract（原文）
To address the “prisoner’s dilemma” faced by China’s coal industry in achieving the dual carbon goals, this paper examines the strategic interactions among large state-owned coal enterprises (LSOEs), small and medium-sized private coal enterprises (SMEs), local governments (LGs), and financial institutions (FLs). A four-party evolutionary game model is developed to analyze the evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) and system equilibria. Numerical simulations are further employed to explore the impacts of key parameters on the system’s evolutionary trajectories. The findings reveal that: (1) LSOEs exhibit a dual mechanism of reputation-driven and policy-responsive behavior, whereas SMEs rely heavily on external economic incentives, underscoring the necessity of differentiated policies. (2) LGs play a dynamic role, evolving from “active guides” to “strategic withdrawers,” balancing the need to break initial market failures against the risk of excessive fiscal burdens in later stages. (3) Market logic naturally biases FLs toward supporting LSOEs, and overcoming SMEs’ financing constraints requires strong government intervention. (4) Achieving coordinated transition depends on a “policy portfolio” that integrates differentiated subsidies, stringent carbon taxation, high-intensity financial incentives, and sustained government credibility. This study provides theoretical support and practical pathways for designing collaborative policy instruments, breaking transition deadlocks, and accelerating progress toward the dual carbon targets.
🔗 Provenance — このレコードを発見したソース
- openalex https://doi.org/10.3389/fenvs.2026.1798776first seen 2026-07-23 05:13:20
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