Strategic Decision-Making in Green Financing: A Game-Theoretic Model and Monte Carlo Simulation of Firm, Investor and Bank Interaction
グリーンファイナンスにおける戦略的意思決定：企業・投資家・銀行の相互作用のゲーム理論モデルとモンテカルロシミュレーション (AI 翻訳)
Alcarva¹ P, Pinto J, Pacheco L, Madaleno M
🤖 gxceed AI 要約
日本語
本論文は、企業がグリーンボンドとグリーンローンを選択する戦略的メカニズムを、3段階の完全情報ゲームとしてモデル化する。後方帰納法で部分ゲーム完全均衡を解析し、20万回のモンテカルロ実験で均衡を評価。グリーンボンド採用率は需要と信用力に依存し、高需要・高信用で79.2%から低需要・低信用で1.5%まで低下する。銀行の譲許的融資は資金調達水準を変えるが、債券とローンの選択には影響しない。
English
This paper models the strategic choice between green bonds and green loans as a three-stage perfect-information game. Using backward induction and a 200,000-draw Monte Carlo experiment, it shows green bond adoption ranges from 79.2% under high demand and strong credibility to 1.5% under weak conditions, with a sharp discontinuity at the participation threshold. Bank concessionality shifts financing levels but not the bond-versus-loan margin.
Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.
📝 gxceed 編集解説 — Why this matters
日本のGX文脈において
日本では、SSBJ開示やGX経済移行債などグリーンファイナンス市場が拡大する中、企業の資金調達手段選択の理論的枠組みは実務に示唆を与える。特に、移行金融の促進やグリーンボンド市場の活性化に向けた政策設計に有用。
In the global GX context
Globally, this paper contributes to transition finance scholarship by formalizing the strategic interaction between issuers, investors, and banks. It provides a tractable framework for assessing sustainability-related financing risk and for empirically separating feasibility, optimality, and institutional transmission channels, relevant to ISSB and CSRD contexts.
👥 読者別の含意
🔬研究者:Provides a formal game-theoretic model and simulation results that can inform empirical studies on green financing choice.
🏢実務担当者:Offers insights into conditions under which green bonds are viable, aiding corporate financing strategy and investor engagement.
🏛政策担当者:Highlights the role of regulatory incentives and bank concessionality in shaping green financing outcomes, useful for policy design.
📄 Abstract（原文）
Green bonds and green bank loans coexist as instruments for financing the low-carbon transition, yet the strategic mechanism through which issuers select between them remains weakly formalized. This paper models green debt instrument choice as a three-stage extensive-form game with perfect information in which a firm first selects a financing route, investors then decide whether to subscribe to a green bond issuance, and a bank sets lending conditions under regulatory incentives. The subgame-perfect equilibrium is characterized analytically by backward induction and is then implemented numerically: the equilibrium correspondence is mapped over the parameter space and evaluated through a Monte Carlo experiment of 200,000 parameter drawing across the eight admissible states of demand, issuer credibility and regulatory regime. Equilibrium green bond issuance requires two conditions to hold jointly, namely investor participation and a demand-driven advantage exceeding the fixed issuance and certification cost. The simulation shows that green bond adoption falls from 79.2% under high demand and strong credibility to 1.5% under moderate demand and weak credibility, with a sharp discontinuity at the participation threshold, and that bank concessionally shifts financing levels without altering the bond-versus-loan margin. The framework provides a tractable basis for assessing sustainability-related financing risk and for the empirical separation of feasibility, optimality and institutional transmission channels.
🔗 Provenance — このレコードを発見したソース
- Research Square https://doi.org/10.20944/preprints202607.2313.v1first seen 2026-08-07 04:37:34
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