役員報酬の説明責任はESG改善を促進するか？報酬回収条項の証拠
Can Executive Pay Accountability Drive ESG Improvement? Evidence from Compensation Clawback Provisions (原題)
Xue Lei
🤖 gxceed AI 要約
日本語
中国A株企業2013-2023年のデータを用い、環境・安全トリガー付き報酬回収条項の導入がESGパフォーマンスを有意に向上させることを実証。経営者は報酬回収リスクを回避するため、現金保有増加や投資変動抑制、環境違反減少などの慎重行動をとる。アナリストカバレッジや独立取締役の出席率が高いほど効果が増幅され、非国有企業や汚染集約型産業で顕著。
English
Using Chinese A-share firms from 2013-2023, this study shows that compensation clawback provisions with environmental and safety triggers significantly improve ESG performance. Executives become more risk-averse, increasing cash holdings, reducing investment volatility, and lowering environmental penalties. Effects are stronger with more analyst coverage and independent director attendance, and in non-state-owned and pollution-intensive firms.
Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.
📝 gxceed 編集解説 — Why this matters
日本のGX文脈において
日本では役員報酬とESG目標の連動が進む中、報酬回収条項の設計はSSBJ開示やコーポレートガバナンス改革の文脈で参考になる。特に環境・安全トリガーを明示する実証は、日本の企業統治実務に示唆を与える。
In the global GX context
This paper contributes to global governance scholarship by linking clawback provisions to ESG outcomes, relevant for ISSB and SEC disclosure contexts. It offers empirical evidence that expanding clawback triggers beyond financial restatements can embed sustainability into executive accountability, a topic of growing interest in global markets.
👥 読者別の含意
🔬研究者:Provides causal evidence on governance mechanisms driving ESG improvement, useful for studies on executive incentives and sustainability.
🏢実務担当者:Suggests designing clawback provisions with ESG triggers and strengthening oversight to improve corporate sustainability performance.
🏛政策担当者:Informs policy on executive compensation and ESG disclosure requirements, highlighting the role of clawback provisions.
📄 Abstract（原文）
As sustainable development reshapes capital market expectations, aligning executive incentives with long-term ESG outcomes has become a pressing governance challenge. Using a sample of Chinese A-share listed firms from 2013 to 2023, we find that implementing compensation clawback provisions with explicit environmental and safety triggers significantly improves corporate ESG performance. Facing concrete pay-recovery threats, executives become more risk-averse, as reflected in higher cash holdings, lower investment volatility, and fewer environmental penalty events, proactively curbing compliance violations to avoid triggering provisions. This effect is amplified by broader analyst coverage and higher independent director attendance rates, confirming that internal and external oversight work in coordination. Further analyses reveal stronger effects among non-state-owned enterprises and pollution-intensive industries. These findings suggest that expanding clawback trigger scope beyond financial restatements and strengthening complementary disclosure practices offer actionable pathways to embed sustainability into executive accountability frameworks.
🔗 Provenance — このレコードを発見したソース
- semanticscholar https://doi.org/10.1142/s0217590826400114first seen 2026-08-27 05:49:51 · last seen 2026-09-11 05:52:04
🔔 こうした論文の新着を逃したくない方は キーワードアラート に登録（無料・3キーワードまで）。
gxceed は公開メタデータに基づく研究支援データセットです。要約・翻訳・解説は AI 支援で生成されています。 最終的な解釈・検証は利用者が原典資料に基づいて行うことを前提とします。