CEO Risk Orientation and Environmental Sustainability Disclosure: Managerial Discretion, Institutional Constraints, and Strategic Transparency
CEOのリスク志向と環境サステナビリティ開示：経営者の裁量、制度的制約、戦略的透明性 (AI 翻訳)
Muhammad Jameel Hussain, R. Zahid, Yang Qian, N. Alessa
🤖 gxceed AI 要約
日本語
本研究は、CEOのリスク志向が環境サステナビリティ開示に与える影響を、中国A株上場企業の2009～2023年のパネルデータを用いて分析。リスク回避的なCEOほど環境情報開示が少なく、開示増加は環境訴訟リスクと関連する。ただし、GRI基準の採用やCSR報告義務化、国有企業、汚染産業などの制度的制約下ではこの関係が弱まる。経営者の行動特性と制度の相互作用が開示の質を決定することを示唆。
English
This study examines how CEO risk orientation affects environmental sustainability disclosure using 37,779 firm-year observations of Chinese listed firms from 2009-2023. Risk-averse CEOs disclose less environmental information, and greater disclosure is linked to higher environmental litigation risk. However, this relationship weakens under institutional constraints such as GRI adoption, mandatory CSR reporting, state ownership, and pollution-intensive industries. Findings highlight behavioral foundations of ESG disclosure and the moderating role of institutional governance.
Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.
📝 gxceed 編集解説 — Why this matters
日本のGX文脈において
日本のサステナビリティ開示（SSBJ）の実務においても、経営者のリスク認識が開示の量や質に影響を与える可能性がある。本研究成果は、開示制度の設計や企業のガバナンス策定に示唆を与える。中国の事例だが、日本企業にも応用可能な知見を含む。
In the global GX context
This paper adds to global understanding of the behavioral drivers of ESG disclosure, showing that CEO risk aversion can suppress transparency. It also demonstrates how institutional mechanisms (mandatory standards, state ownership) can mitigate managerial discretion—relevant for policymakers designing disclosure frameworks like ISSB or CSRD.
👥 読者別の含意
🔬研究者:Provides empirical evidence on the intersection of upper echelons theory and sustainability disclosure, with implications for future research on managerial incentives and institutional governance.
🏢実務担当者:Highlights that CEO risk preference influences disclosure practices; boards should consider this when setting sustainability strategy and oversight.
🏛政策担当者:Suggests that mandatory reporting standards (e.g., GRI) and state ownership can reduce the negative effect of CEO risk aversion on disclosure, informing regulatory design.
📄 Abstract（原文）
This study examines whether CEO risk orientation shapes environmental sustainability disclosure (ESD) and how institutional constraints condition this relationship. We argue that environmental disclosure constitutes a strategic exposure decision because greater transparency can increase regulatory scrutiny and stakeholder pressure. Using 37,779 firm‐year observations of Chinese A‐share listed firms from 2009 to 2023, we find that firms led by more risk‐averse CEOs disclose significantly less environmental information; additional analyses show that greater environmental disclosure is associated with higher environmental litigation exposure. However, the relationship weakens in contexts that constrain managerial discretion, including the adoption of Global Reporting Initiative standards, mandatory CSR reporting requirements, state ownership, and pollution‐intensive industries. These findings highlight the behavioral foundations of sustainability disclosure and demonstrate how institutional governance moderates executive influence over corporate transparency.
🔗 Provenance — このレコードを発見したソース
- semanticscholar https://doi.org/10.1002/bse.70927first seen 2026-05-15 18:03:21
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