THE DISCIPLINING EFFECT OF EXIT THREAT: NON-CONTROLLING LARGE SHAREHOLDERS AND CORPORATE ESG DISCLOSURE QUALITY — EVIDENCE FROM CHINESE A-SHARE MARKETS
退出の脅威の規律効果：非支配的大株主と企業のESG情報開示の質 — 中国A株市場からの証拠 (AI 翻訳)
Weihao Sun, Lei Wang
🤖 gxceed AI 要約
日本語
本研究は中国A株市場のデータを用い、非支配的大株主の「退出の脅威」が経営陣のESG情報開示の質を向上させることを実証した。操作変数法や傾向スコアマッチングを用いて内生性に対処し、情報非対称性の低減と評判コストの増大がメディエーターであることを示した。特に非国有企業や市場化度の高い地域で効果が顕著である。
English
Using a dataset of Chinese A-share listed firms from 2010-2023, this study finds that the threat of exit by non-controlling large shareholders significantly improves corporate ESG disclosure quality. Mechanism tests show this effect operates through reduced information asymmetry and increased reputation costs. The disciplining effect is stronger in non-state-owned enterprises and firms in highly marketized regions. The paper extends the 'Governance by Exit' theory to non-financial disclosure.
Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.
📝 gxceed 編集解説 — Why this matters
日本のGX文脈において
本論文は中国市場に焦点を当てているが、非支配的大株主の退出脅威がESG開示の質に与える影響を実証した点は、日本企業においても株主エンゲージメントやスチュワードシップ責任の議論に示唆を与える。特にSSBJ対応において、投資家のモニタリング機能が開示の質を高める可能性を示唆している。
In the global GX context
This paper contributes to the global literature on corporate governance and ESG disclosure by identifying a market-based disciplining mechanism—exit threats from large shareholders. It is particularly relevant for emerging markets and for policymakers designing market-based supervision. The findings also inform the ongoing debate on the role of institutional investors in climate-related disclosure under ISSB and SEC rules.
👥 読者別の含意
🔬研究者:Empirical evidence on how large shareholders' exit threats improve ESG disclosure quality; useful for governance and disclosure scholars.
🏢実務担当者:Corporate sustainability teams can understand the importance of shareholder monitoring and consider how to address large shareholder concerns to improve disclosure.
🏛政策担当者:Shows that market-based mechanisms like exit threats can enhance disclosure quality; relevant for designing disclosure regulations in emerging markets.
📄 Abstract（原文）
This study investigates the governance role of non-controlling large shareholders in emerging markets, specifically focusing on whether their "threat of exit" can compel management to improve environmental, social, and governance (ESG) information disclosure. Utilizing a comprehensive dataset of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2023, the research employs a two-way fixed effects model to analyze the relationship between exit threats—measured by the interaction of shareholding size and stock liquidity—and ESG disclosure quality. The methodology rigorously addresses endogeneity through instrumental variable approaches and propensity score matching. The main results demonstrate a significant positive correlation: as the credibility of the exit threat rises, corporate ESG disclosure quality improves markedly. Mechanism tests reveal that this effect is mediated by the reduction of information asymmetry and the escalation of potential reputation costs for management. The study further indicates that this disciplining effect is more pronounced in non-state-owned enterprises and firms within highly marketized regions. The author's contribution lies in extending the "Governance by Exit" theory to the realm of non-financial disclosure, identifying specific internal transmission mechanisms, and providing policy implications for enhancing market-based supervision in transition economies.
🔗 Provenance — このレコードを発見したソース
- semanticscholar https://euraseans.com/index.php/journal/article/download/1494/1101first seen 2026-07-18 07:40:52
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