投資信託におけるグリーンウォッシング

Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.

🔬研究者:Provides a theoretical framework and typology for studying greenwashing in mutual funds, useful for empirical research on ESG disclosure and rating divergence.

🏢実務担当者:Offers a checklist of greenwashing typologies to help asset managers and compliance teams align with evolving regulations and avoid misleading claims.

🏛政策担当者:Highlights regulatory gaps and proposes a global minimum standard, informing policy design for sustainable fund labeling and disclosure.

The world financial environment is in the process of structural change, due to the massive boom in Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) investing. The change has made the mutual fund industry to be a leading platform of sustainable capital allocation. Nevertheless, this booming growth has been marred by the all-encompassing threat of greenwashing the act of strategic misleadership of investors on the environmental and social performance of financial products. The paper presents a strident multi-jurisdictional study of greenwashing processes in the international mutual fund market. We compile Signalling Theory and Agency Theory to build a conceptual theory that explains why asset managers have an incentive to pursue misleading ESG disclosures in the situation of information asymmetry. This paper uses a systematic review of current literature and critical comparative analysis of the key regulatory regimes in particular the Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation (SFDR) by the European Union and the proposed amendments to the Names Rule by the United States Securities and Exchange Commission. We make a contribution to the field by the codification of four typologies of greenwashing in the mutual funds: (1) Misaligned Messaging, which is based on the semantic ambiguity; (2) Portfolio Dilution, which is the existence of the so-called Brown in Green effect where the portfolios do not have a significant deviation with respect to the non-ESG benchmarks; (3) Exaggerated Impact where the faulty attribution models are used to inflate the realistic outcomes; and (4) Operational Disparity that highlights the gap between firm-level promises Our statistical results indicate that contemporary regulatory fragmentation and low correlation of third-party ESG ratings (the "Aggregate Confusion" effect) offers an ideal setting of rating arbitrage and strategically reclassification. The procedure is critically based on the systemic implications of these practices on the efficiency of markets as well as investor trust and the relative cost of capital of carbon-intensive and sustainable firms, globally. The paper will end with a recommendation of a single Global MinimumSustainable Fund Standard (GMSFS) and the implementation of technological interventions, in particular the utilization of the Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) to immutable hashing of portfolios, to restore integrity to sustainable finance. This overall discussion can be used in further empirical studies of the greenwashing signal cost in competitive financial markets.

• openaire https://doi.org/10.9790/5933-1703017786first seen 2026-09-01 05:03:25 · last seen 2026-09-21 04:33:59