Buffering or Binding? Political Connections and Firms’ Sustainability Disclosure Strategies in China
緩衝か拘束か？中国企業の政治連携と持続可能性開示戦略 (AI 翻訳)
Mengqi Xie, Qichang Ma, Kwan Nok Chan
🤖 gxceed AI 要約
日本語
中国の上海・深圳上場企業の政治連携とBloomberg環境開示スコアを用いて、政治的に連携した企業は通常は開示が弱いが、規制圧力が高まると透明性を高めることを発見。中央機関との連携でこの効果が顕著。持続可能性コンプライアンスにおける政治連携の二重効果を実証。
English
Using an original dataset of political connections for Shanghai and Shenzhen-listed firms (2011-2021) and Bloomberg environmental disclosure scores, we find that politically connected firms typically adopt weaker disclosure but become more transparent under heightened regulatory scrutiny, especially those with ties to central institutions. This dual effect carries implications for steering corporate behavior toward climate mitigation.
Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.
📝 gxceed 編集解説 — Why this matters
日本のGX文脈において
中国の政策連動企業の開示行動を分析した本論文は、日本企業の政治連携がSSBJや有報での開示に与える影響を考察する際の参考になる。特に規制圧力の強弱による戦略的変化は、日本の企業統治と開示文化の理解に示唆を与える。
In the global GX context
This paper provides evidence on how political connections shape sustainability disclosure compliance under varying regulatory pressure, offering insights for global disclosure scholarship on the strategic behavior of politically embedded firms. It contributes to understanding the effectiveness of regulatory mandates in emerging economies with state-business ties.
👥 読者別の含意
🔬研究者:Provides empirical evidence on the conditional effect of political connections on disclosure compliance, relevant for corporate governance and sustainability regulation research.
🏢実務担当者:Highlights that political ties can be both a buffer and a binding force; firms should anticipate scrutiny shifts and align disclosure strategies accordingly.
🏛政策担当者:Suggests that regulatory pressure can override the buffering effect of political connections, but the design of enforcement intensity is crucial for compliance outcomes.
📄 Abstract（原文）
How do politically connected firms comply with regulatory mandates on sustainability practices? Current debate centers on whether politically connected firms are “buffered” from regulations that could hinder their business or become “bound” to them because their position in the state-business network makes noncompliance more problematic. Using an original dataset on the political connections of Shanghai and Shenzhen-listed firms in China from 2011 to 2021, combined with Bloomberg’s environmental disclosure scores, we find that the compliance of politically connected firms with sustainability is strategically conditioned to regulatory pressure. Normally, firms that are politically more connected tend to adopt weaker environmental disclosure practices than firms that are less connected. However, the former become more transparent than the latter when regulatory scrutiny intensifies. This shift is particularly pronounced for firms with ties to central institutions. The dual effects of political connections on firms’ compliance with sustainability practices carry important implications for steering organizational behavior toward climate change mitigation.
🔗 Provenance — このレコードを発見したソース
- crossref https://doi.org/10.1177/10860266261463604first seen 2026-07-28 06:24:24
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