保証とESG格付の乖離がサステナビリティ開示義務の情報価値を制限しうる
Assurance and ESG rating divergence can limit the informational value of sustainability disclosure mandates (原題)
Ramyashree M S, Sahanashree N, Pavithra Salanke, N. Jayashree
🤖 gxceed AI 要約
日本語
本論文は、開示量を増やせば投資家の判断が改善するという規制前提を「credibility wedge（信頼性の楔）」概念で批判する。作成者・保証者・格付者の三層構造がそれぞれ異なる失敗様式を持ち、楔が拡大すると追加開示の限界情報価値はゼロに収束すると論じる。EU・ISSB採用国・米国・インドBRSR Coreの4類型に適用し、開示範囲拡大より先に検証・格付インフラを整備すべきと結論する。
English
This conceptual paper challenges the regulatory premise that more sustainability disclosure yields better-informed investors. It introduces the 'credibility wedge'—the gap between disclosure quantity and investor-perceived reliability—and models a three-layer architecture of preparer, assurer and rater, each with distinct failure modes. Twelve propositions link regime design to belief revision and cost of capital; as the wedge grows, marginal informational returns to disclosure approach zero, implying verification and rating infrastructure must precede scope expansion.
Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.
📝 gxceed 編集解説 — Why this matters
日本のGX文脈において
SSBJ基準の導入と有報でのサステナビリティ開示義務化が進む日本にとって、開示量偏重への警鐘は保証制度・格付活用の設計に直結する。第三者保証の質とESG格付のばらつきをどう規律するかは、日本企業の投資家対応コストと資本調達に影響する論点である。
In the global GX context
Directly relevant to ISSB/IFRS S1・S2 adoption and CSRD assurance debates: it argues that assurance quality and rating divergence—not disclosure volume—determine whether mandates improve capital allocation. This reframes the global policy conversation toward building verification and rating infrastructure before widening disclosure scope.
👥 読者別の含意
🔬研究者:開示規制の情報価値を保証・格付の信頼性から分析する新たな理論枠組みと検証可能な8モデルを提供する。
🏢実務担当者:開示量の拡大より第三者保証の質と格付対応が投資家評価を左右することを示唆する。
🏛政策担当者:開示範囲の拡大前に保証・格付インフラの整備を優先すべきという規制設計上の示唆を与える。
📄 Abstract（原文）
Abstract Regulators increasingly treat disclosure quantity as the principal policy lever, assuming that more sustainability disclosure yields better-informed investors and more efficient capital allocation. This conceptual paper argues that the assumption is misspecified. Disclosure moves investor beliefs only insofar as it is credible, and credibility is manufactured downstream of the reporting entity, by assurance providers who verify and rating agencies who aggregate. We develop the construct of the credibility wedge, the gap between the quantity of sustainability information a firm discloses and the reliability investors attach to it. Drawing on costly state verification, cheap-talk and signalling models, ambiguity-based asset pricing and institutional theory, we specify a three-layer architecture of preparer, assurer and rater, each with a distinct failure mode. Twelve propositions connect regime design to the wedge, and the wedge to belief revision, the cost of capital and capital allocation. A two-by-two typology is derived and applied to the four architectures observable in 2026: the narrowed European regime, jurisdictions adopting IFRS S1 and S2, the United States, and India’s BRSR Core. As the wedge grows, the marginal informational return to additional disclosure tends to zero, implying that verification and rating infrastructure must be built before disclosure scope is widened. India offers an unusually favourable research setting, and eight estimable models are specified. For the 2030 Agenda, target 12.6 and its report-counting indicator track disclosure volume rather than decision-useful information, making credible verification a precondition for reporting to advance SDGs 12 and 13.
🔗 Provenance — このレコードを発見したソース
- openalex https://doi.org/10.1007/s43621-026-05271-6first seen 2026-11-10 05:08:48 · last seen 2026-11-13 05:20:13
- semanticscholar https://doi.org/10.1007/s43621-026-05271-6first seen 2026-11-12 06:01:59 · last seen 2026-11-13 06:06:12
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