経営者の自発的開示戦略と自発的サステナビリティ保証が投資判断に与える影響
<p>The Effects of Management's Voluntary Disclosure Strategy and Voluntary Sustainability Assurance on Investment Judgments</p> (原題)
Macy Knutson, Tamara A. Lambert, Chad M. Stefaniak
🤖 gxceed AI 要約
日本語
非専門家ESG投資家を対象とした3×2実験で、サステナビリティ開示戦略（不均衡・均衡・均衡＋解決策）と第三者保証の有無が投資判断に与える影響を検証。不都合な情報を含む均衡開示は、好都合情報のみの不均衡開示よりも知覚パフォーマンスと投資意欲を低下させる。自発的保証は均衡開示時の投資を増加させるが、均衡開示に伴うペナルティを完全には解消しない。保証と改善策開示は部分的に代替関係にあることを示す。
English
A 3×2 experiment with nonprofessional ESG investors examines how voluntary sustainability disclosure strategy (unbalanced, balanced, balanced resolution) and third-party assurance jointly affect investment judgments. Balanced disclosure containing unfavorable information lowers perceived sustainability performance and investment willingness relative to unbalanced favorable-only disclosure. Voluntary assurance increases investment under balanced disclosure but does not eliminate the balanced-disclosure penalty; assurance and forward-looking remediation disclosures act as partial substitutes.
Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.
📝 gxceed 編集解説 — Why this matters
日本のGX文脈において
SSBJ基準の適用や有報でのサステナビリティ開示が進む日本では、企業が不都合な情報をどのように開示し、保証をどう活用するかが投資家対応の焦点となる。本論文は均衡開示のコストと保証の緩和効果を実験的に示し、日本企業の開示戦略設計に示唆を与える。
In the global GX context
As ISSB/CSRD and SEC climate disclosure regimes push toward balanced reporting and assurance, this study provides experimental evidence on how investors react to unfavorable sustainability information and whether assurance mitigates the penalty. It informs the global debate on assurance readiness and disclosure quality under emerging mandatory frameworks.
👥 読者別の含意
🔬研究者:開示の均衡性と保証が投資家判断に与える相互作用を実験的に示した点で、開示研究・保証研究の双方に貢献する。
🏢実務担当者:不都合な情報を含む均衡開示は投資意欲を下げうるが、第三者保証を付すことで緩和できるため、保証取得の戦略的価値を再認識すべき。
🏛政策担当者:保証の義務化や均衡開示の促進を検討する際、保証が投資家のネガティブ反応を完全には打ち消さない点を考慮した制度設計が求められる。
📄 Abstract（原文）
This study examines how voluntary sustainability disclosure strategy and thirdparty assurance jointly affect ESG investors' judgments. In a 3×2 experiment, nonprofessional ESG investors evaluate a firm's sustainability report that varies disclosure strategy (unbalanced, balanced, or balanced resolution) and voluntary assurance (absent or present). We find that unfavorable sustainability information lowers perceived sustainability performance and investment willingness when management provides balanced rather than unbalanced disclosure containing only favorable information. Voluntary assurance increases investment when disclosure is balanced, consistent with assurance tempering the negative sustainability performance inferences from unfavorable information, but does not eliminate the penalty associated with balanced disclosure. We also find that forward-looking resolution disclosure increases investment when assurance is absent, suggesting that assurance and remediation disclosures serve partially substitutive roles. Supplemental analyses indicate investor motivation shapes these effects. Our findings inform sustainability disclosure, voluntary assurance, and investor judgment research and offer practical insights for firms evaluating sustainability reporting strategies.
🔗 Provenance — このレコードを発見したソース
- openaire https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.7397999first seen 2026-11-05 04:40:21 · last seen 2026-11-06 04:29:01
🔔 こうした論文の新着を逃したくない方は キーワードアラート に登録（無料・3キーワードまで）。
gxceed は公開メタデータに基づく研究支援データセットです。要約・翻訳・解説は AI 支援で生成されています。 最終的な解釈・検証は利用者が原典資料に基づいて行うことを前提とします。