企業サステナビリティと経営者株式報酬インセンティブ：中国におけるESG開示品質の証拠
Corporate Sustainability and Executive Equity Incentives: Evidence from ESG Disclosure Quality in China (原題)
Xin Huangfu, Hamezah Md Nor
🤖 gxceed AI 要約
日本語
中国A株上場企業2010〜2024年を対象に、経営者への株式報酬制度導入がESG開示品質に与える影響をPSM-DIDで検証。導入後に開示品質が有意に向上し、特に環境次元で反応が大きい。経営者の近視眼的傾向の緩和が部分的メカニズムとして示唆される。契約期間が長い企業、成熟企業、汚染産業で効果が大きい傾向。
English
Using PSM-DID on Chinese A-share firms (2010-2024), this study finds that adopting executive equity incentive plans significantly improves ESG disclosure quality, with the strongest effect in the environmental dimension. Reduced managerial myopia appears to be a partial mechanism. Effects are larger for longer contractual horizons, mature firms, and polluting industries.
Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.
📝 gxceed 編集解説 — Why this matters
日本のGX文脈において
日本ではSSBJ基準・有報でのサステナビリティ開示が進み、経営者報酬とESG指標の連動（報酬委員会・統合報告書）が議論されている。本稿は報酬設計が開示品質を高める可能性を示し、日本企業のガバナンス設計や投資家対話の根拠として示唆的。
In the global GX context
As ISSB/SSBJ and CSRD push mandatory sustainability disclosure, this paper links governance design—executive pay—to disclosure quality, offering evidence for compensation-committee debates on tying pay to ESG metrics. It adds non-Western empirical evidence to the global disclosure-governance literature.
👥 読者別の含意
🔬研究者:経営者報酬とESG開示品質の因果関係をPSM-DIDで示した実証研究として、ガバナンス・開示研究の参照点になる。
🏢実務担当者:報酬制度にESG指標を組み込む際、開示品質向上や近視眼緩和の根拠として経営・報酬委員会で活用できる。
🏛政策担当者:報酬開示・ESG開示規制の設計において、インセンティブ設計が開示行動を左右する点を考慮すべき。
📄 Abstract（原文）
Environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosure is increasingly important for corporate sustainability, yet less is known about how internal incentive arrangements shape firms’ sustainability transparency. This study examines changes in ESG disclosure quality following executive equity incentive plan adoption among Chinese A-share listed firms from 2010 to 2024. We employ a propensity-score-matched difference-in-differences (PSM-DID) design to compare firms adopting equity incentive plans with similar firms that remain untreated. The results show that ESG disclosure quality increases significantly following plan adoption, and the main finding remains robust across multiple robustness checks, including estimators that account for staggered treatment timing. The improvement extends across environmental, social, and governance disclosure, with the strongest response in the environmental dimension. Mechanism analysis provides evidence consistent with reduced managerial myopia as a partial channel. Further analyses show larger point estimates for longer contractual horizons, mature firms, and firms in polluting industries, although only the life-cycle difference is marginally significant. Overall, the findings suggest that executive equity incentives are associated with greater sustainability transparency, consistent with the view that incentive design can shape managerial decision horizons and disclosure behavior.
🔗 Provenance — このレコードを発見したソース
- openalex https://doi.org/10.3390/su182010358first seen 2026-10-14 05:10:45
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