空売りとESG格付の乖離：情報開示の協働ガバナンス効果
Short‐Selling and ESG Rating Divergence: The Collaborative Governance Effect of Information Disclosure (原題)
Qingjun Zhang, Ke Du, Wenhao Cai
🤖 gxceed AI 要約
日本語
中国A株上場企業2009〜2021年を対象に、空売りメカニズムが第三者機関間のESG格付乖離を有意に緩和することを多時点DIDで示す。空売りは負の情報伝達を通じ、外部資本市場の監督強化と企業ガバナンス改善の二経路で情報環境を変え、情報開示が協働ガバナンスとして機能する。自発的開示とサステナビリティ委員会はこの効果をさらに強める。
English
Using A-share listed firms (2009-2021) and a staggered DID design, this paper finds that short-selling significantly mitigates ESG rating divergence among third-party agencies. Short-selling reshapes firms' information environment via stronger external capital-market oversight and improved governance, with disclosure playing a collaborative governance role. Voluntary disclosure and sustainability committees further strengthen this effect.
Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.
📝 gxceed 編集解説 — Why this matters
日本のGX文脈において
ESG格付のばらつきは日本でも投資家対応・統合報告書作成上の課題であり、SSBJ開示の質向上や格付機関間の評価差を巡る議論に示唆を与える。空売りという市場規律と開示の相互作用は、日本企業の情報開示戦略を考える上で参考になる。
In the global GX context
ESG rating divergence is a central concern for ISSB/CSRD-era disclosure quality and for investors relying on ratings. This paper links a market-based governance mechanism (short-selling) to rating convergence, adding evidence from China's disclosure and regulatory environment to global debates on what drives rating disagreement.
👥 読者別の含意
🔬研究者:ESG格付乖離の決定要因として市場メカニズムと開示の相互作用を定量化した点が参考になる。
🏢実務担当者:自発的開示とサステナビリティ委員会の整備が格付評価の安定化に寄与し得ることを示唆する。
🏛政策担当者:空売り規制と開示制度の設計が格付の質と資本市場の情報環境に与える影響を考慮すべき。
📄 Abstract（原文）
ABSTRACT In contrast to previous studies on the impact of firm‐specific behavior, this paper examines whether and how the short selling mechanism affects ESG rating divergence among third‐party rating agencies from an information disclosure perspective. Based on a sample of A‐share listed companies from 2009 to 2021, this paper empirically finds that the short selling mechanism significantly mitigates the ESG rating divergence among third‐party rating agencies using a multi‐temporal double‐difference model. Further research shows that short selling, as a market‐based governance mechanism based on the trading and transmission of negative information, changes the internal and external information environment of firms, optimizes the allocation of information resources through the dual approach of strengthening external capital market supervision and improving the level of corporate governance, and information disclosure plays a collaborative governance role in the process of this change, thereby mitigating ESG rating divergence. In the process of this change, disclosure plays a collaborative governance role, which in turn mitigates ESG rating divergence. Meanwhile, voluntary disclosure by management has a positive moderating effect on the short‐selling mechanism, which inhibits the widening of ESG rating divergence under voluntary disclosure conditions. Moreover, the positive regulatory effect of the short‐selling mechanism by the sustainability commission enhances its role in mitigating ESG rating divergence. This paper reveals the intrinsic link between the short‐selling mechanism and third‐party agency ESG rating divergence, which is of great theoretical and practical significance for promoting the quality of capital market development and corporate sustainable development practices.
🔗 Provenance — このレコードを発見したソース
- openalex https://doi.org/10.1002/ijfe.70290first seen 2026-09-10 04:48:32
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