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Executive compensation clawbacks and corporate climate engagement

経営者報酬のクローバック条項と企業の気候変動への関与 (AI 翻訳)

Abdul Ghafoor, Yasar Bayraktar, Ammar Ali Gull, Mirzet Šeho

Journal of Accounting Literatureプレプリント2026-03-20#ESGOrigin: US
DOI: 10.1108/jal-02-2025-0053
原典: https://doi.org/10.1108/jal-02-2025-0053

🤖 gxceed AI 要約

日本語

本研究は、米国上場企業を対象に、経営者報酬のクローバック条項の採用が企業の気候変動関与に与える影響を分析。気候関与指数(CINDEX)を用いた実証分析の結果、クローバック条項は気候関与を向上させ、企業の気候変動リスクを低減することを発見。この効果は業種やESG連動報酬の有無にかかわらず一貫している。

English

This study investigates how the adoption of executive compensation clawbacks affects corporate climate engagement for US-listed firms from 1996-2017. Using a Climate Engagement Index (CINDEX) based on four variables including CDP reporting, the authors find that clawback provisions increase climate engagement by about 0.12 standard deviations and reduce firms' exposure to climate risks. The positive effect holds across industries and regardless of existing ESG-linked compensation policies.

Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.

📝 gxceed 編集解説 — Why this matters

日本のGX文脈において

日本の文脈では、報酬クローバック条項はまだ一般的ではなく、本結果は日本企業がESG経営を強化する上で参考になる。特に、SSBJや有報での気候関連開示が進む中、ガバナンスとインセンティブ設計の連動が今後の課題となる。

In the global GX context

This paper contributes to the global GX literature by establishing a causal link between compensation governance and climate engagement. For practitioners and policymakers under TCFD/ISSB frameworks, it provides evidence that clawbacks can serve as a tool to align executive incentives with climate goals, potentially informing regulatory approaches in the EU and US.

👥 読者別の含意

🔬研究者:Provides causal evidence on how clawbacks drive climate engagement, using rigorous methods to address endogeneity.

🏢実務担当者:Boards and compensation committees can use clawbacks as a mechanism to enhance corporate climate performance and mitigate climate risks.

🏛政策担当者:Regulators may consider incorporating clawback provisions into sustainability disclosure frameworks to strengthen accountability.

📄 Abstract(原文)

Purpose The purpose of this study is to investigate how the adoption of executive compensation clawbacks affects the climate engagement initiatives of firms listed in the US Based on agency theory, we test two competing arguments – (1) the proactive risk management view and (2) the excessive caution view – to examine whether clawback provisions improve or constrain corporate climate engagement efforts. Design/methodology/approach Our sample includes firms listed in the US from 1996 to 2017. We measure corporate climate engagement by creating a Climate Engagement Index (CINDEX) based on four variables: (1) the appointment of sustainability executives, (2) Carbon Disclosure Project reporting, (3) climate-related lobbying and (4) pro-climate coalition membership. To investigate causality and mitigate possible endogeneity issues, we employ several empirical methods, including propensity score matching, instrumental variable regression and a battery of robustness tests. Findings Our results support the proactive risk management view. We find that clawback provisions increase corporate climate engagement. Specifically, firms adopting clawback provisions exhibit an increase in climate engagement of approximately 0.12 standard deviations relative to firms without such provisions. Furthermore, we show that the positive effect of clawback provisions persists across both environmentally sensitive and non-sensitive industries, as well as in firms with or without ESG-linked compensation policies. Finally, we document that climate engagement initiatives driven by clawback provisions reduce firms' exposure to climate change risks. Practical implications Our results have practical implications, showing that clawback provisions are valuable governance tools that promote corporate climate engagement and help mitigate climate-related risks. Boards, managers and investors should consider clawbacks not only as safeguards against misconduct but also as mechanisms to align executive incentives with environmental objectives. Policymakers and regulators have a clear role in incorporating clawback provisions into sustainability frameworks to strengthen corporate accountability and support long-term climate goals. Originality/value Our study extends the existing literature on clawback provisions beyond financial outcomes by linking them to corporate sustainability. We identify clawback provisions as a key governance mechanism for promoting climate engagement and demonstrate their effectiveness across various organizational contexts. This contributes to a deeper understanding of how compensation-based governance mechanisms affect environmental performance.

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