強制ESG開示とグリーンウォッシュ：中国における準自然実験からの証拠
Mandatory ESG disclosure and greenwashing: evidence from a quasi-natural experiment in China (原題)
Yin-Zi Tan, Ling-Li Qi, Guanqiuyue Chen, Iek Hang Ngan, Long-Sheng Wu
🤖 gxceed AI 要約
日本語
香港の2016年強制ESG報告義務を準自然実験として、A株・H株上場中国企業2013〜2021年をDID分析。強制開示はグリーンウォッシュを0.755ポイント（標本平均の168%）有意に増加させた。不正のトライアングル枠組みで、外部圧力の増大・規制裁定の機会・トーン操作による内部正当化の三経路を特定。執行が弱い環境では開示義務が実質的対応より象徴的コンプライアンスを促しうると示す。
English
Using Hong Kong's 2016 mandatory ESG reporting mandate as a quasi-natural experiment, this DID study of Chinese A- and H-share firms (2013–2021) finds mandatory disclosure increased greenwashing by 0.755 points (168% of the sample mean). A fraud-triangle framework identifies three mechanisms: heightened external pressure, regulatory arbitrage, and internal rationalisation via tone manipulation. Under weak enforcement, disclosure mandates may foster symbolic rather than substantive compliance.
Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.
📝 gxceed 編集解説 — Why this matters
日本のGX文脈において
SSBJ基準の適用と有報・統合報告書でのESG開示義務化が進む日本にとって、開示義務が形式対応を招くリスクは直接の示唆を持つ。執行体制と開示品質をどう両立させるかは、金融庁・SSBJの制度設計上の論点となる。
In the global GX context
As ISSB/CSRD and SEC climate rules expand mandatory disclosure globally, this paper is a cautionary counterpoint: mandates without enforcement capacity can amplify greenwashing. It informs the debate on assurance, enforcement, and anti-greenwashing rules (e.g. EU Green Claims Directive) in emerging and weak-enforcement markets.
👥 読者別の含意
🔬研究者:開示義務の実質的効果を測る因果推論設計と、グリーンウォッシュ測定・トーン操作分析の手法が参考になる。
🏢実務担当者:開示拡大が形式対応に陥るリスクを認識し、トーン操作ではなく実質的データと第三者保証の整備を優先すべき。
🏛政策担当者:開示義務化と同時に執行・監査・保証の強化を設計しないと、象徴的コンプライアンスを助長しうる点に留意すべき。
📄 Abstract（原文）
Against the global push for sustainability, mandatory Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) disclosure has been widely adopted to enhance corporate transparency. However, its effectiveness in emerging markets with weak institutional enforcement remains uncertain. This study exploits Hong Kong’s 2016 mandatory ESG reporting mandate as a quasi-natural experiment and employs a difference-in-differences (DID) design to examine its impact on greenwashing among Chinese firms listed on both the A-share and the H-share markets over the period 2013–2021. We find that mandatory disclosure significantly increased greenwashing by 0.755 points, equivalent to 168% of the absolute sample mean. Grounded in the fraud triangle framework, we further identify three underlying mechanisms intensified external pressure, regulatory arbitrage opportunities, and internal rationalisation through tone manipulation. Overall, our findings suggest that, in the presence of weak enforcement, disclosure mandates may inadvertently encourage symbolic compliance over substantive actions, yielding important implications for both corporate ethics and regulatory policy.
🔗 Provenance — このレコードを発見したソース
- semanticscholar https://doi.org/10.1080/09640568.2026.2633736first seen 2026-11-05 05:51:08
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