Does ESG-linked compensation moderate the executive opportunism driven by mandatory ESG disclosure regulation? Interceding role of audit efficacy and media attention
ESG連動報酬は、強制的なESG情報開示規制によって引き起こされる役員の機会主義的行動を緩和するか？監査の有効性とメディアの注目の介在的役割 (AI 翻訳)
Rajesh Desai
🤖 gxceed AI 要約
日本語
インド上場企業1,105社を対象に、強制ESG開示規制が役員の機会主義的行動を抑制し、財務報告の質を向上させることを実証。監査の有効性とメディアの注目が媒介要因として機能し、ESG連動報酬がその効果を増幅することを示した。DID法とPSMによる頑健性検証を実施。
English
Using a DID approach on 1,105 Indian listed firms, this study shows that mandatory ESG disclosure regulation curbs executive opportunism and improves financial reporting quality. Audit efficacy and media attention mediate this effect, and ESG-linked compensation strengthens it. Robustness checks include PSM and placebo tests.
Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.
📝 gxceed 編集解説 — Why this matters
日本のGX文脈において
日本ではSSBJ開示が義務化されつつあり、開示規制が経営行動に与える影響は重要。本研究成果は、日本の有報・統合報告書における開示の実効性向上や、役員報酬設計への示唆を与える。
In the global GX context
As ISSB and CSRD mandates expand globally, this study provides empirical evidence that mandatory ESG disclosure can reduce managerial opportunism, with ESG-linked pay as a reinforcing mechanism. It offers insights for regulators designing disclosure regimes and for boards aligning incentives with sustainability goals.
👥 読者別の含意
🔬研究者:Provides causal evidence on the governance effects of mandatory ESG disclosure and the moderating role of ESG-linked pay.
🏢実務担当者:Suggests that linking executive compensation to ESG metrics can enhance the benefits of disclosure regulations.
🏛政策担当者:Highlights that mandatory ESG disclosure can improve corporate transparency and accountability, with ESG-linked pay as a complementary policy tool.
📄 Abstract（原文）
Purpose This research aims to analyze how mandatory ESG reporting legislation affects executive opportunism through the quality of financial reporting. The study also examines audit efficacy and media attention as mechanisms and explains the moderating effect of ESG-linked pay on the nexus between ESG regulation and managerial opportunistic behavior. Design/methodology/approach This study adopts the difference-in-differences (DID) approach to examine a sample of 1,105 listed Indian firms classified as ESG-regulated (n = 463) and control firms (n = 642) from 2011 to 2020, considering 2016 as the implementation year. Moreover, the robustness of the findings is validated using several tests, including alternative proxies for measurement bias, propensity score matching for selection bias and a placebo test for causal validation. Findings The empirical findings conclude that the enforcement of mandatory ESG regulation impedes executive opportunism and enhances the quality of financial disclosures. The study further determines that audit efficacy, by strengthening internal oversight, and media attention, by increasing public scrutiny, act as mediating channels. Moreover, the affirmative effects of ESG regulation are more pronounced for companies with ESG-linked executive compensation. Practical implications This study provides critical implications for policymakers to leverage statutory ESG disclosures for improving corporate transparency and accountability. For managers, the study recommends using ESG-linked compensation to align managerial goals with stakeholder interests and augment the positive effects of sustainability regulations. Originality/value To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study to analyze the moderating effect of ESG-linked pay on the nexus between ESG regulation and executive opportunism. Furthermore, this study pioneers the empirical examination and explanation of the mechanisms that transmit the effects of ESG legislation.
🔗 Provenance — このレコードを発見したソース
- openalex https://doi.org/10.1108/ijaim-11-2025-0371first seen 2026-08-13 05:10:37
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gxceed は公開メタデータに基づく研究支援データセットです。要約・翻訳・解説は AI 支援で生成されています。 最終的な解釈・検証は利用者が原典資料に基づいて行うことを前提とします。